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ESTATE CREDITORS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
Sarajane Love*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope' caused the usually staid
legal enclave of estate administration to sit alert. The Court
declared unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute that barred
creditors of decedents from filing claims against the decedents'
estates two months after published notice of the commencement
of probate proceedings.2 The statute violated the due process
rights of known and reasonably ascertainable creditors because
it did not require a better form of notice to them.3 In failing to
require actual notice to known creditors, the statute was not
drastically atypical of other statutes regulating creditors' claims
against the estates of deceased debtors. Therefore, it was not
surprising that many legislatures, bar association committees,
and scholars attempted to assess the effect of Pope on statutes
in states other than Oklahoma. This article is a continuation of
the dialogue on the impact of Pope,' but it sounds a contrary

* Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. BA, Emory University; J.D., University of Georgia School of Law. I owe a debt of gratitude to my
colleague, Richard V. Wellman, for sharing many conversations about this article as it
was in progress, and to Elizabeth A. Horky, my research assistant, for her very able,
careful and timely assistance. Any errors or omissions are my sole responsibility.
1. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
2. Id. at 479 (referring to QKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 333 (West 1981)).
3. Id. at 491.
4. See, e.g., Thomas E. Allison, Due Process Requirements in Estate Administration: More than the Law Allows?, 10 PROB. L.J. 1 (1990); Kristin G. Fruehwald, Notice to Creditors-Publicationis No Longer Enough, 24 IND. L. REV. 1045 (1991);
Dean J. Konrardy, Pope and Iowa Probate, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 575 (1989-90); Mark
Reutlinger, State Action, Due Process, and the New Nonclaim Statutes: Can No Notice
Be Good Notice If Some Notice Is Not?, 24 REAL PROP., PROB. Tr. J. 433 (1990); Patti
S. Spencer, The Plight of the Personal Representative After Pope: A Response to Professor Allison, 10 PROB. L.J. 55 (1990); Thomas L. Waterbury, Notice to Decedents'
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note by arguing, first (and rather modestly), that the decision
does not necessarily apply across the board because a number
of statutory regimes, illustrated most prominently by the Uniform Probate Code, do not have the degree of "state action"
that marked the Oklahoma statutory regime in Pope. Second
(and more boldly), the article argues that the majority opinion
in Pope erred in its application of constitutional due process
principles to nonclaim statutes that cut off the creditors of
decedents' estates.
II. THE PoPE CASE
H. Everett Pope, Jr. died at the St. John Medical Center in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, on April 2, 1979.' He had been a patient at
the Medical Center for over four months,6 incurring expenses
in excess of $142,000. Mr. Pope's insurer paid for most of his
expenses, but the Medical Center claimed a balance due of over
$14,000. 7 More than three months after Mr. Pope's death, his
will was admitted to probate and his widow was appointed his
personal representative.' Pursuant to an Oklahoma probate
statute,9 Mrs. Pope immediately published notice in a newspaper for two weeks that creditors of the decedent should come
forward and present their claims.' ° Another statute barred any
claims that were not presented within two months of the first
publication of notice." No claim for the hospital expenses was
filed.' Four years later, Tulsa Professional Collection Services,
Inc., a subsidiary of the Medical Center and the assignee of its

Creditors, 73 MINN. L. REV. 763 (1989); Brian J. Doherty, Comment, Notice and the
Missouri Probate Nonclaim Statutes: The Lingering Effects of Pope, 59 Mo. L. REV.
187 (1994); Stephanie G. Sarcone, Note, Tulsa Professional Collection Services v.

Pope: Analysis and Application by the Courts, 39 DRAKE L. REv. 179 (1989-90).
5. Estate of Pope, 733 P.2d 396, 397 (Okla. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
6. Pope was admitted on November 23, 1978. Id. at 397.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 331 (1991).

10. 733 P.2d at 397.
11. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 333 (1991). A preliminary issue argued to the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether expenses of the last illness were subject to the time
bar. 733 P.2d at 398-99.
12. 733 P.2d at 397.
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claim against the decedent, commenced suit for the balance
allegedly due.'
Mrs. Pope prevailed in the state courts of Oklahoma. She
successftilly defended Collection Services' claim that it had been
denied due process of law.'4 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
joined most other courts that had considered whether the constitutional notice requirement mandated by Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.' 5 applied to probate proceedings
that involve a nonclaim bar. The court held that nonclaim statutes are distinguishable and that publication by notice is sufficient.'6 Relying extensively on earlier court opinions from other
states, the court emphasized that cutting off creditors through
the operation of a nonclaim statute is a different procedure
than adjudicating someone's rights or interests in a judicial
proceeding.' 7 The different nature of the proceedings means
that notice serves a different function. In the case of adjudication, notice makes the person served a party to the case; in the
case of a nonclaim statute, notice merely allows the person to
whom it is addressed to become a party if he or she wishes. 8
The Oklahoma court captured the difference in Mullane-type
situations and the one at hand by characterizing the probate
nonclaim statute as a "self-executing statute of limitations," 9 a
phrase that would reverberate in the United States Supreme
Court opinions. Emphasis on the self-executing nature of the
statute's operation shifts the focus of analysis away from the
issue of notice in the early stages of probate and toward the
comprehensive, automatic time bar that takes place later.
In the half dozen or so cases questioning the constitutionality
of nonclaim statutes, the issue of state action had never appeared as a barrier to consideration of the creditors' arguments,

13. Id.
14. In fact, the due process argument was an afterthought, having been asserted
for the first time on a petition for rehearing in the Oklahoma Court of Appeals. Id.
at 399.
15. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
16. 733 P.2d at 400-01.
17. Id. at 401.
18. Id. at 400.
19. Id at 401 (citing Estate of Busch v. Ferrell Duncan Clinic, Inc., 700 S.W.2d
86, 88-89 (Mo. 1985)).
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nor had the state courts ever relied on the absence of state
action as grounds for upholding the statutes. In the Supreme
Court of the United States, however, the preliminary issue of
whether there was any state action that would invoke due
process protection became overt for the first time in the Pope
case. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor deemed it necessary to explain why there was sufficient state action to require compliance with due process standards. ° State action
existed as a result of the extensive involvement of the Oklahoma probate court. It was "intimately involved throughout, and
without that involvement the time bar is never activated." 21
Having found that the Due Process Clause was thereby implicated, the Court found that the state's legitimate interest in
handling probate proceedings expeditiously did not justify dispensing with the burden of giving actual notice to "known or
reasonably ascertainable creditors."22
III. THE STATE ACTION ISSUE

The proposition that the constitutional restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment apply only when there is state action
sounds straightforward enough, but the detours, dead ends,
ruts, and roadblocks of the state action doctrine have become
familiar obstacles to those who must travel through its territory. Its lack of predictability is notorious, summed up neatly by
Professor's Black's exasperated conclusion that it is "a conceptual disaster area."23 While the outcome of the state action test
may always be in some doubt, there is a consensus that the
starting point can be identified; the Supreme Court has indicated that making the determination involves "sifting facts and
weighing circumstances." At a minimum, then, it is always
imperative to understand and then continuously to keep in

20. Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 492 (1988)
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.
21. Id. at 487.
22. Id. at 489.
23. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95
(1967).
24. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961), quoted in
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).

1996] ESTATE CREDITORS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE UPC

415

mind the context in which the action occurs. For this reason, it
is necessary to sketch briefly the development of the probate
system. It is especially important as a predicate for understanding the forces that the Uniform Probate Code reacted against
and the lengths to which it went to downplay state-mandated
judicial involvement in the process of winding up the affairs of
decedents.
A. A Brief History of Estate Administration
The American system of probate is patterned generally on
the unwieldy English system that eventually involved three
different court systems: the ecclesiastical or spiritual courts, the
common law courts, and chancery.' These three courts each
asserted authority over different aspects of distributing the
goods of decedents.2" Because of inadequacies in the common
law actions available to creditors of decedents, creditors' claims
were often brought in equity, thereby plunging estates into the
morass of delay and expense that became the hallmark of chancery." This trifurcated system, particularly with respect to the
payment of debts, "became highly intricate, costly, and fraught
with hazard to even the most prudent and well-meaning executor or administrator."2 8 Parliament finally reformed the English system in the middle of the nineteenth century by eliminating the church's participation and treating land and person-

25. Lewis M. Simes & Paul E. Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in
America, 42 MICH. L. REV. 965, 967-74 (1944).
26. 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK AND FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 348 (2d ed. 1968); LEwIS M. SIMEs & PAUL E. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN
PROBATE LAW 387 (1946) [hereinafter PROBLEMS]; 1 J.G. WOERNER & WILLIAM F.
WOERNER, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION 472-79 (3d ed.

1923); Professor Helmholz has found evidence in the rolls of the church courts that
casts doubt on the accepted wisdom that debt issues were outside the jurisdiction of
the church courts. This jurisdiction appears to have ended during the late fifteenth
and early sixteenth centuries. R.H. Helmholz, Debt Claims and Probate Jurisdiction
in Historical Perspective, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 68, 69 (1979); see also Thomas E.
Atkinson, Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction,8 Mo. L. REv. 107, 11213 (1943) who likewise acknowledges some early jurisdiction over debts in the spiritual courts.
27. THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 688 (2d ed. 1953)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK].
28. 2 WOERNER & WOERNER, supra note 26, at 1179.
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alty alike.29 The English reform came long after the American
states had settled into a variety of patterns for handling
decedents' affairs.
It was impossible for the American colonies to mimic the
English system, because the colonies lacked an institution resembling the ecclesiastical courts. Nevertheless, it is generally
thought that the ecclesiastical courts are, at least in spirit, the
forerunner of American probate courts because the concept of a
personal representative to preside over the proper disposition of
the decedent's personal estate developed under their aegis.3"
The personal representative was either an executor named in
the decedent's will, or an administrator appointed by the ordinary."1 A system revolving around a personal representative
whose duties and powers derived from appointment contrasted
with the continental system of universal succession that recognized the heir as a sort of natural continuation of the decedent,
even to the point that liability for all of the decedent's debts
was as much a part of the succession as the decedent's assets.3 2
The personal representative was at the center of the systems adopted in America (with the exception of Louisiana,
whose civil law heritage retains universal succession), but there
was, and still is, a great variety in the superstructure that
surrounds the personal representative. The judicial figure involved has ranged from an official without legal training presiding over an inferior court to a judge of a court of general jurisdiction.33 The court may or may not be a court of record; the
appeal from its decisions may be a de novo review by a court of

29. PROBLEMS, supra note 26, at 395.
30. PROBLEMS, supra note 26, at 412-13; Atkinson, supra note 26, at 107.
31. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 26, at 336, 361; Atkinson, supra note 26,
at 107.
32. See Max Rheinstein, European Methods for the Liquidation of the Debts of
Deceased Persons, 20 IOWA L. REV. 431, 434-435 (1975). In England, the advent of
primogeniture in the descent of land forestalled any acceptance of the Roman concept
of universal succession. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 26, at 331-32. Therefore,
even though the descent of land in England was outside the church's system of supervised administration, it was not based on the notion of universal succession.
33. See generally, PROBLEMS, supra note 26, at 399-405 (discussing the evolution
of the probate court system in America).
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general jurisdiction, or it may be an appeal through regular
channels to an appellate court.'
Amidst this diversity, however, there has been a common
pattern of gradually increasing the involvement of a court official in the process of administering the estate.3 5 In comparison, the English ordinary's primary responsibility was to admit
wills to probate and grant letters of administration to the personal representative; he put the process in motion, but thereafter it proceeded without ongoing, routine supervision."6 Professors Simes and Basye described the extension of judicial oversight as "needed," but they did not elaborate on the basis for
the need.3" Professor Rheinstein, on the other hand, painted a
more jaded picture of the growth of judicial control when he
attributed it "in no slight degree" to "the welcome opportunity
to exact fees, or to secure the intervening authority's own interests in some other way as by levy of inheritance taxes."8
Until the twentieth century, adding red tape to increase the
degree of court supervision of the administration of estates may
have been largely meaningless as a practical matter. Informal
administration was common in the United States until the
early 1900s. Until then, the heirs or will beneficiaries seem to
have satisfied creditors and to have agreed amicably about
division of property among themselves without need of court
oversight.3 9 In Texas, the statutes encouraged such extrajudicial settlements by providing that administration of an estate
should take place only when it was necessary.4 ° Around the
turn of the century, one respected observer expressed smug
satisfaction with the American system, whatever its variations:

34. Id at 416-17.
35. Id at 401.
36. Id.
37. Id. Cf. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the
Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1120 (1984) (attributing the structure and
procedure of the probate system to the need to pay creditors).
38. Rheinstein, supra note 32 at 438.
39. Eugene F. Scoles, Succession Without Administration: Past and Future, 48 Mo.
L. REv. 371, 374 (1983).
40. TEYL PROB. CODE ANN. art. 178(b) (West 1980). This provision has been essentially the same since 1876. Scoles, supra note 39, at 384 n.48.
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The American courts of probate, with their extensive
powers, their simple and efficient procedure, their happy
adaptation to the wants of the people in the safe, speedy,
and inexpensive settlement of the estates of deceased persons attest the marvelously clear insight of the people of
the Colonies and young States into the principles involved,
and the genuine instinct which guided them in their realization.4 1
It was only about sixty years later that another respected
observer bemoaned the state of probate law in America and
warned that "[s]omething-and perhaps something quite extreme-must be done if the law is to keep pace with popular
demand, unorganized as this demand might be."42
It is not the purpose of this article to document changes in
statutes or the habits of the people during the intervening sixty
years. The significant fact is that the dissatisfaction with the
probate system had spread beyond scholars and authors whose
main business was the law of wills and probate. The average
person on the street also had come to perceive probate as a
rapacious beast and lawyers as its masters, if not its creators.
Norman Dacey, the most outspoken of probate's critics, wrote,
"[i]n most areas of this country the probate procedure is a scandal, a form of tribute levied by the legal profession upon the
estates of its victims, both living and dead."4 3 Additional articles about the probate "mess" were written by Murray Bloom
and stirred up the readership of The Reader's Digest."
Unfortunately, some of the problems identified with probate
were caused by the unsavory influences of corruption and political patronage,4 5 but the layers of routine and seemingly unnecessary procedures were also insidious contributing factors.
41. 1 J.G. WOERNER, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION 322
(2d ed. 1889).
42. HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 574-75.
43. NORMAN F. DAcEY, HOW TO Avom PROBATE 7 (1st ed. 1965).
44. Murray Teigh Bloom, Do-It-Yourself Probate-It's Here, READER'S DIG., July
1975, at 109 [hereinafter Do-in-It-Yoursell; Murray Teigh Bloom, The Mess in Our
Probate Courts, READER'S DIG., Oct. 1966, at 102. In the first article cited, Bloom
used recent probate reforms in Wisconsin as a springboard to continue the attack on
the unreformed systems in other states. Do-It-Yourself at 112; see also MURRAY TEIGH
BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 203-16 (1968) [hereinafter TROUBLE].
45. See TROUBLE, supra note 44, at 233-63.
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Bloom condemned a system of "checks and double checks" required by law, for which lawyers charged percentage fees based
on the size of the estate.46 One practicing attorney noted the
plethora of statutes governing administration of estates and
opined that it "encourages the average practitioner to think of
probate practice as an opportunity to shoot fish in a barrel, and
get well paid for doing it."47 The simplicity of so many routine
probate tasks' raised a number of questions. If the tasks were
so simple, could nonlawyers, even the surviving family members, perform tasks themselves? Were the tasks really necessary
in the first place? Alternatively, were there ways of transferring
property to survivors without having to use the ponderously
slow and expensive probate procedure? It is only natural that
laypeople, left to their own devices, turned to a remedy that
they could execute by themselves. They bypassed the lawyers
by bypassing the system that the lawyers had commandeered.
Several legal devices existed for passing title outside probate,
such as holding property in joint tenancy form with the right of
survivorship, or creating a living trust. With alacrity, the public
seized on these devices, and a probate avoidance movement was
begun. The movement was epitomized by Norman Dacey, who
capitalized on the public sentiment by authoring a best-selling
book, How to Avoid Probate!, which offered do-it-yourself forms
for use by the book's purchasers, enveloped between pithy attacks on lawyers and the probate courts.49
A few short years before the storm of probate avoidance
erupted, work on the Uniform Probate Code had begun in
46. Id. at 208.
47. Daniel F. Carmack, Common Problems in Administration of Decedents' Estates,
14 CLEV. MARSHALL L. REv. 179, 179 (1965).
48. Judith N. Cates, coauthor with Marvin B. Sussman and David T. Smith of
the classic study, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE (1970), reported,
We also interviewed 78 of the lawyers who were involved in these estates. Oh, they liked probate work all right. They said it's pretty simple,
almost always just a matter of filling in forms at the proper time, and a
lot of it was so routine their secretaries did the actual form-filling. Most
of them admitted they were handsomely paid for probate work.
TROUBLE, supra note 44, at 213.
49. DACEY, supra note 43. Purchasers of Dacey's book were informed in large
block letters on the Table of Contents page that "all will and trust forms are on
pages which are perforated for easy removal from the book." See also Richard V.
Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: A Possible Answer to ProbateAvoidance, 44 IND.
L.J. 191, 192 (1969) [hereinafter Answer].
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1962.50 The project was brought to fruition in 1969 as the public outcry reached a crescendo. The U.P.C. project was not initially the result of public pressure, but was largely a continuation of the reform spirit that had produced the Model Probate
Code5 in the 1940s. However, the increased use of probate
avoiding devices clearly became a concern, as well as ammunition to persuade lawyers to give the U.P.C. a warmer reception
than that accorded the MPC.52 The public hue and cry over
the expense of probate and the growing tendency to spurn probate by using alternative devices to dispose of property may
have been the inspiration behind the decision to take a more
aggressive approach to reform than the Model Code. 3 It was
not enough to streamline court procedures; the overarching
theme of the Uniform Probate Code would be to remove the
courts from the process of probate and administration to the
greatest extent feasible.
At the time of the U.P.C.'s adoption by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association, numerous published articles appeared;
most of them were aimed at explaining the operation of the
U.P.C. and urging its adoption.' To those in the academic
50. The project was a joint undertaking of the American Bar Association Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law Section and the Uniform Law Commissioners. Nine
law professors served as reporters and were advised by a committee of about 25 lawyers. Richard V. Wellman, Lawyers and the Uniform Probate Code, 26 OKLA L. REV.
548, 550-51 (1973) [hereinafter Lawyers and the U.P.C.].
51. The Model Probate Code was a project of a committee of the Probate Law
Division of the Section of Real Property and the Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association, in conjunction with a research project of the Michigan Law
School. Professors R.G. Patton, Lewis M. Simes and Thomas E. Atkinson were prominently involved, assisted by Paul E. Basye. The Code was presented in 1945, after
five years of research and drafting. In its presentation, the drafting committee traces
the seeds of reform to several articles by Professor Atkinson that appeared in the
Journal of the American Judicature Society in 1939 and 1940. PROBLEMS, supra note
26, at 5.
52. "Perhaps you think that probate avoidance is good for law business. If so, rd
like to hear about it. Elsewhere around the country, lawyers tend to agree that revocable trusts and joint tenancies are hard on fees." Lawyers and the U.P.C., supra
note 50, at 549; see also Answer, supra note 49, at 191.
53. The Model Code was "cut along very conservative lines," but nevertheless
served as an important wedge for the ideal of probate reform. Richard V. Wellman,
The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN. L. REV. 453,
456 n.51 (1969) [hereinafter Blueprint].
54. Professor Richard V. Wellman, the Chief Reporter for the Uniform Probate
Code, authored most of these publications, writing eloquently, and at times passion-
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world and in jurisdictions that have enacted the U.P.C., the
contours of its procedural reformations are, or should be, familiar. However, the memories of those who do not work in the
pedagogical front lines may well have faded since the first massive wave of writings about the U.P.C.55 A brief refresher
course is therefore in order.
To achieve its goal of minimizing judicial involvement in the
probate and administration process, the drafters of the U.P.C.
created the Flexible System designed to respond both to the
routine estate needing minimal administration and to larger,
more complex, or more controversial estates where judicial
oversight might be welcomed by those involved."8 Central to
the operation of the Flexible System is the existence of an official within the probate court, denominated a "registrar" by the
U.P.C., who handles informal proceedings on a nonadjudicative
basis.5 7 A "key concept" in creating the Flexible System was
"that the court or Registrar, though inevitably involved in the
creation of the status of the personal representative, does not
exercise supervisory jurisdiction over its appointee."58 Under

ately, about the need for probate reform. See, e.g., id.; Lawyers and the U.P.C., supra
note 50, at 548; Answer, supra note 49, at 191.
Other publications were written primarily for state audiences in hopes of influencing particular state legislatures and the members of the probate bar. One thorough and extensive analysis obviously fell on deaf ears; the Oklahoma bar and legislature left largely intact the probate regime that later became the subject of Pope.
See Orey R. Lilly, Jr., The Uniform Probate Code and Oklahoma Law: A Comparison, Part 1, 8 TULSA L.J. 159 (1972) [hereinafter Lilly I]; Orley R. Lilly, Jr., The
Uniform Probate Code and Oklahoma Law: A Comparison, Part II, 9 TULSA L.J. 1
(1973) [hereinafter Lilly II].
55. It might be appropriate to observe also that sitting judges who graduated
from law school before the mid-sixties are unlikely to have any feel for the structure
and purposes of the U.P.C., whether or not they sit in a jurisdiction that has adopted
it, because appointments to the bench tend to come from more politically connected
segments of the bar such as trial or corporate lawyers. This observation assumes that
many law professors who teach courses in wills and estates have used the U.P.C. as
a pedagogical tool in both U.P.C. and non-U.P.C. states ever since its introduction.
But, alas, even classroom exposure (indoctrination?) may be a fleeting thing;, query
how much understanding of probate procedure is retained by a trial or corporate
lawyer whose wills and estate professor taught the U.P.C. to her or him in the 1960s
or 1970s.
56. 1 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL 5 (Richard V. Wellman, ed., 2d
ed. 1977) [hereinafter PRACTICE MANUAL].

57. U.P.C. § 1-201(19) (1993). Informal proceedings can be used to probate a will
or appoint a personal representative.
58. Id.
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the auspices of the registrar, a will can be offered for "informal"
probate, and the administration of the estate (testate or intestate) can be carried out on an unsupervised basis.5 9 Informal
probate of a will entails a "statement" of informal probate,"
rather than an adjudication of validity, and the statement is
issued following a finding of routine facts, such as the
application's completeness and the propriety of venue."' An
unsupervised administration can take place after a will is probated or after the decedent is declared intestate and a personal
representative is named.62 The U.P.C. grants the personal representative adequate powers to carry out the administration of
the estate without further contact with the court.63
In the drafting process, the committee considered the issue of
giving notice to interested parties. Its primary concern was not
about creditors, however, but about notice of initial stages,
particularly the probate of a will or the opening of an intestate
administration." Notice was debated both from a pragmatic
and from a constitutional point of view. As a practical matter,
it was hard to escape the conclusion that excessive notice requirements, whether personal or by publication, were not effective protective devices and would seriously undermine the drive
for simplification, rendering it all but futile.6" Nor did the committee believe that Mullane dictated notice because under the
informal, unsupervised system devised by the U.P.C., there
59. Id.
60. U.P.C. § 3-302 (1993).
61. U.P.C. § 3-303(a) (1993). However, a safety valve backstop gives the registrar
some discretion to deny the application for informal probate for failure to satisfy statutory requirements, but it is stipulated that such a denial "is not an adjudication."
U.P.C. § 3-305 (1993). Recourse for the proponent who believes the denial is in error
is to apply for formal probate. U.P.C. § 3-305 cmt. (1993).
62. Informal probate need not be followed by any administration whatsoever. See
PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 58, at 203-05.
63. See generally U.P.C. art. III, pt. 7. The personal representative's detachment
from the court is emphasized by § 3-704, which directs the personal representative to
proceed expeditiously with the settlement and distribution of a decedent's
estate and, except as otherwise specified or ordered in regard to a supervised personal representative, do so without adjudication, order, or direction of the Court, but he may invoke the jurisdiction of the Court, in
proceedings authorized by this Code, to resolve questions concerning the
estate or its administration.
U.P.C. § 3-704 (1993).
64. See Blueprint, supra note 53, at 463-67, 496-500.
65. Id. at 469, 499.
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were no "adjudications" handed down by a court and, therefore,
no proceedings
applied. 6

to which the Mullane notice requirements

Informal probate and unsupervised administration are not, of
course, the exclusive means of handling estates under the
U.P.C., but they are the default procedures that operate unless
affirmative action is taken to opt for formal probate or supervised administration." The U.P.C. recognizes that formal probate and some court proceedings under supervised administration are adjudications and therefore require actual notice.6 8
The flexibility of the system is maximized by the ability of the
participants in each case to determine how little or how much
court involvement is desirable. For example, a formal proceeding to probate a will can be combined with an informal appointment of the personal representative, 69 or a personal representative conducting an unsupervised administration can initiate
court proceedings for particular problems as needed." In the
final analysis, then, the amount of judicial intrusion in any
given estate administration under the U.P.C. is determined by
the choices of private individuals and not by a statutory scheme
legislated by the state.
Simplicity and efficiency are also hallmarks of the U.P.C.'s
treatment of creditors, which is basically the same whether the
administration of the estate is supervised or unsupervised. In
the original version of the U.P.C., the personal representative
was required to publish a notice for three weeks notifying credi-

66. Id. at 496-500 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1956)). In hindsight, it seems ironic that the possible constitutional infirmity of notice by publication to creditors was ignored.
No-notice probate has been criticized as violative of procedural due process.
Note, The Constitutionality of the No-Notice Provisions of the Uniform Probate Code,
60 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1976).
67. The affirmative action necessary to trigger formal probate is a petition by an
interested party. U.P.C. § 3-401 (1993). Supervised administration may be requested
by an interested party or the personal representative. U.P.C. § 3-502 (1993). If the
decedent's will directs a supervised administration, the court must order one unless a
change of circumstances since the will's execution alleviates the need for supervised
administration. In the absence of a testamentary direction, the court may order supervised administration only if it finds it necessary under the circumstances. Id.
68. U.P.C. §§ 3-403(a), 3-502, 7-206 (1993).
69. U.P.C. § 3-401 (1993); see also U.P.C. art. III general cmt. (1993).
70. U.P.C. § 3-704 (1993); see also U.P.C. art. III general cmt. (1993).
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tors to present their claims within four months of the first
publication of notice, or be forever barred.7 As a back-up to
the four-month bar running from the publication of notice, the
drafters also included a statute of limitations period of three
years, measured from the death of the decedent, which would
operate in cases where notice was not published.7
The four-month, or "short-term,"v" nonclaim bar, which is
the U.P.C.'s analogue of the nonclaim bar declared unconstitutional in Pope, was clearly adopted for the benefit of the estate
beneficiaries other than creditors. As the comments state, "This
should expedite settlement and distribution of estates."7 4 However, creditors' interests were not overlooked, as the U.P.C. simplified the process of presenting and allowing claims. Furthermore, it was thought that the period allowed was reasonable for
commercial, personal, and family creditors to learn of the death
and respond to it.75 Tort creditors were recognized as a special
case, and neither the four-month nor the three-year limits applied to them, to the extent that their claims were covered by
liability insurance.7"
The Pope decision unleashed a debate within the Joint Editorial Board of the U.P.C. over whether amendments to comply
with Pope should be proposed. The pivotal issue was that of
"state action," to be discussed below. Ultimately, a majority of
the Board took the cautious position that it should propose
amendments that would satisfy Pope for the benefit of those

71. U.P.C. §§ 3-801(a), 3-803(a)(1) (1969).
72. U.P.C. § 3-803(a)(2) (1969).
73. Professor Falender, in an academic precursor to Pope, distinguished between
so-called "short-term" nonclaim periods triggered by a particular probate activity such
as issuance of letters or publication of notice and "long-term" periods typically keyed
by the decedent's death, and, as the terminology suggests, of longer duration. Debra
A. Falender, Notice to Creditors in Estate Proceedings: What Process is Due?, 63 N.C.
L. REv. 659, 667 (1985). In her scheme of things, the distinction is crucial because
she concludes that long-term nonclaim statutes do not entail sufficient state action to
warrant constitutional review. Id. at 674. The Pope decision made clear that it did
not apply to "nonclaim statutes that run from the date of death, and which generally
provide for longer time periods. . . ." Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485
U.S. 478, 488 (1988). This limitation on the scope of the holding in Pope cleared the
way for the U.P.C.'s 1989 amendments in response to Pope.
74. U.P.C. art. III, pt. 8, general cmt. (1993).
75. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 58, at 337.
76. U.P.C. § 3-803(d)(2) (1993).
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jurisdictions where concerns existed, but without altering the
Code's basic framework." The revamped notice provisions give
the personal representative the option of giving notice by publication, personal notice by mail, or no notice at all." If notice
is by publication, there is a four-month nonclaim bar just as
under the original U.P.C."9 If the personal representative
chooses to give notice by mail, the creditor has at least sixty
days after the mailing or other delivery of the notice to present
a claim before being barred. 0 The long-term limitation was
shortened from three years to one year.8 ' Because the one-year
limitation period begins to run at death (like the three-year
limitation that it replaced 2), there is no longer any nexus between the termination of creditors' claims and any court proceedings, and therefore, it can be argued that the state action
that tainted the Oklahoma nonclaim bar has been avoided.83
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

U.P.C. app. IV, at 511 (1991).
U.P.C. § 3-801 (1993).
U.P.C. §§ 3-801(a), 3-803(a)(2) (1993).
U.P.C. §§ 3-801(b), 3-803(a)(2) (1993).
U.P.C. § 3-803(a)(1) (1993).
U.P.C. § 3-803(a)(2) (1969).
See U.P.C. app. IV (1991); see also supra note 73.
Professor Reutlinger has responded to the U.P.C. amendments with sharp skepticism, inquiring cleverly, "Can no notice be good notice if some notice is not?" Mark
Reutlinger, supra note 4, at 433. Reutlinger's argument that the 1989 U.P.C. amendments still fail constitutional muster is based on an extremely generous view of the
state action doctrine as it applies to procedural due process. In his view, the
"Grimpin Mire," id. at 442, of state action is all-pervasive and unavoidable with respect to all varieties of statutes that shorten the statute of limitations on decedents'
creditors, both short-term nonclaim statutes and long-term nonclaim statutes, which
he denominates as "probate statutes of repose." Id. at 435. The flaw in Professor
Reutlinger's analysis is his failure to distinguish the state action question for purposes of due process requirements of notice and/or a hearing from the state action question for purposes of challenging legislation on other constitutional grounds, such as
equal protection. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
This oversight leads to the astonishing proposition that all statutes of limitation are subject to review on procedural due process grounds. See, e.g., Reutlinger,
supra note 4, at 451, 455. Furthermore, Reutlinger asserts that a "garden variety"
statute of limitation escapes a notice requirement because the event which causes it
to commence "is operatively known or knowable by the plaintiff or claimant." Id. at
456. Query: whether a victim of intentional fraudulent concealment would agree with
Professor Reutlinger's assertion and whether any legislature would seriously consider
an act requiring those guilty of concealment to give notice to their victims that a
statute of limitations has commenced to run on their cause of action.
Professor Reutlinger is forced into making these questionable conclusions by yet
another dubious distinction that he derives from what the Supreme Court did not say
in Texaco Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982): the distinction between giving notice of
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B. State Action and the U.P.C.
Having considered the historical context of estate administration, and before focusing on the state action issue in Pope, some
consideration must be given to the legal context. Three separate
threads form the analytical core of discussions regarding the
constitutionality of probate nonclaim statutes: the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, state action, and socalled self-executing statutes of limitation. All of these elements
are crucial parts of recent discussions of the matter, but unfortunately, the relationship between them is not always clear.
Upon reflection, this state of affairs is probably inevitable given
the maddening refusal of "state action" to take a definite form.
Nevertheless, for one who wishes to address the "state action"
issue in Pope, some attempt to delineate the relationship of the
three elements is a necessary step, even though the result may
be a picture whose pieces do not fit precisely.
First, what is the relationship between the concept of "state
action" and the underlying constitutional right being invoked
(in this case, the Due Process Clause)? Second, does a "selfexecuting statute of limitation" escape constitutional invalidity
because it negates state action, or because of the way the Due
Process Clause applies (or does not apply) to it?
Most simply understood, state action is a necessary prerequisite for application of the constitutional limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The amendment restricts the actions of
states, not the actions of private individuals." Viewed thusly,
the state action concept serves as a threshold issue, separate
and apart from the merits of the underlying constitutional argument. Professors Nowak and Rotunda have characterized this
as a "unitary concept" of state action.85 The concept of state
the expiration of a statute of limitations and giving notice of the commencement of
the running of the limitations period. Id. at 454. This distinction is factually specious
in that the purpose of a notice requirement is to inform the recipient of the potential
deprivation of a property right; notice of the commencement of the limitations period
and notice of its pending expiration are indistinguishable in that regard. If one is
notified that the statute of limitations is about to expire, isn't one alsp on notice that
the period of limitations has commenced?
84. "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
85. JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.5, at 483

1996] ESTATE CREDITORS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE UPC

427

action as a self-contained entity would seem to lead naturally
to tests or formulas that would measure the sufficiency of state
action with mechanical or quantifiable standards. However, the
refusal of the state action question to allow itself to be reduced
to any clear-cut, formalistic, or mechanical tests is well known
and beyond debate.
Professor Tribe distills the case law of state action with his
characterization of it, not as doctrine, but as "anti-doctrine.""
Although the unitary understanding of state action is said to be
widespread,8 7 and certainly is appealing because of its
straightforwardness, the cases indicate that at times the merits
of the underlying constitutional issue exert a force on the determination of the state action question.88 Therefore, one must
begin any attempt to deal analytically with the state action
issue by recognizing that there is no single truth, or even a set
of truths, that will serve to narrow the path and define its
destination. State action is unitary, and it is not unitary; it is
doctrine, and it is anti-doctrine.
Likewise, the precise analytical role of the much-bruited
phrase "self-executing statutes of limitation" is ambiguous. The
concept of nonclaim bars as statutes of limitation, with or without the qualifying description of them as "self-executing," was
the basis for a number of the pre-Pope state court opinions that
upheld such statutes against attacks based on Mullane.8 9 The
United States Supreme Court also used the phrase "self-execut-

(4th ed. 1991).
86. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW § 18-1, at 1691 (2d ed.
1988).
87. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 85, at 483.
88. Professor Tribe notes that the state action determination is influenced by the
substantive constitutional right that is at stake. Tribe, supra note 85, § 18-3, at
1699-1700. Nowak and Rotunda note the exceedingly high correlation between the
Court's findings of constitutional violations and state action; the one "minor exception"
is Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), where the court found state
action, but upheld the challenged action. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 85 § 12.5,
at 485 n.5.
89. Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1985) (en
banc) (holding that notice by publication fulfills due process requirements for purpose
of notice to creditor); In Re Estate of Fessler, 302 N.W.2d 414 (Wis. 1981) (contending
that creditor's probate claim was cut off by statute of limitations, thus Mullane's
notice requirements did not apply); Gano Farms, Inc. v. Estate of Kleweno, 582 P.2d
742 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that publication notice of appointment of decedent's
personal representative was sufficient to put creditor on notice).
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ing" to describe the Indiana Mineral Lapse Act, which was
upheld in Texaco, Inc. v. Short.9" The point being made was
that the respective statutes' operations did not present procedural due process problems because they were not proceedings
or adjudications, as in Mullane.9 1 In these cases, the courts
seem to address the merits of the due process argument by
defining the scope of the Mullane holding; to have separately
addressed the question of the existence of state action would
not have affected the outcome because in any event, the nonclaim statutes did not offend the due process notice requirement embodied in Mullane.
The first comprehensive academic treatment of notice to
decedents' creditors92 was published prior to the Pope decision
and, if one may judge from the Court's citations, was influential
in the decision.93 Its author, Professor Falender, echoed the
more traditional and settled attitudes reflected above. She tilts
toward the unitary concept of state action because she views it
as a "trigger" for the application of the Fourteenth Amendment
and finds it exists in the probate court's order appointing the
personal representative, which is "a [pirerequisite to invocation
of the short-term nonclaim period."94 The fact that there is
90. 454 U.S. 516, 535-36 (1982).
91. "The reasoning in Mullane is applicable to a judicial proceeding brought to
determine whether a lapse of a mineral estate did or did not occur, but not to the
self-executing feature of the Mineral Lapse Act." Id. at 535.
92. Falender, supra note 73, at 659.
93. Professor Falender's article is cited four times in the court's opinion. Tulsa
Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 479, 480 (two citations), and
489 (1988). These citations are to the background material gathered by Professor
Falender on nonclaim statutes. Professor Falender, of course, was not writing with
reference to the facts of the Pope case or the Oklahoma probate scheme. She was
reacting to the decision of the Nevada Supreme Court in Continental Ins. Co. v.
Moseley, 683 P.2d 20 (Nev. 1984), which cursorily struck down the Nevada nonclaim
statute after remand by the United States Supreme Court. Falender, supra note 73,
at 663-64. When academics write for a (hopefully) national audience, one can hardly
expect that they restrict their attention to a single state's statute or probate scheme.
Professor Falender's article is certainly typical in that sense. However, her unquestioning assumption that all nonclaim statutes are fungible for due process purposes is
too broad. Even she admits that "state statutes vary enough to make precise delineation of a single, typical estate proceeding impossible." Id. at 664 n.24. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court in Pope continued Professor's Falender's generalizations about the
setting of nonclain statutes and wrote an opinion that was far too broad for the facts
before it. It is much easier to forgive Professor Falender for writing an overly comprehensive law review article than it is to forgive the Supreme Court for purporting
to decide the constitutionality of statutes that were not before the Court.
94. Falender, supra note 73, at 675. Although Professor Falender is careful to
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some clearly identifiable "state" action in the form of a single
routine court order, and that there is some nexus between that
court order and the running of a nonclaim bar, is sufficient to
satisfy a mechanical notion of state action. Professor Falender
does not explore in any meaningful way the relationship
between the court and the personal representative, nor does she
explore the court's involvement in the process of administering
the estate of a decedent.95 She isolates the nonclaim statute,
disregarding the milieu in which it exists. 5 She even gives the
impression that the U.P.C.'s nonclaim statute is the grandparent of them all by using it in a footnote as the leadoff example
of "prevailing wisdom ...
expressed almost universally in
7
statutes."
Professor Falender also reflects the pre-Pope understanding of
the significance of the analogy between nonclaim statutes and
statutes of limitation: it is relevant to the consideration of the
Due Process issue, not to the preliminary question of whether
state action exists.98 Either Mullane applies and adequate notice is required, or nonclaim statutes are statutes of limitation
that escape Mullane's strictures.9 9
The analytical structure of the majority opinion in Pope is
not as easy to fathom as Professor Falender's article. Although

link the state action to the alleged constitutional deprivation, the termination of the
creditor's claim by operation of a time bar, Professor Reutlinger takes the unitary
view of state action to its extreme by suggesting that state action in the form of the
state's initial enactment of a statute imposing a time bar is sufficient to call forth
due process notice obligations regardless of what causes the time bar to begin running. See Reutlinger, supra notes 4 & 83, at 449. The "unitariness" of his view of
state action is heightened by his assertion that a death-triggered time bar is an even
stronger case of state action than a time bar triggered by the personal
representative's publication of notice under court supervision. Id. at 458-59. The involvement of the personal representative somehow acts to reduce the amount of state
involvement that perpetually emanates from the act of legislation. Id. at 451. This
reflects a unitary approach to state action in that Reutlinger is measuring or
quantifying the "amount" of state action in each case. Id. at 451.
95. See Falender, supra note 73, at 674-75.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 660.
98. Id. at 666-67.
99. Id. at 675-77, 685. Professor Falender concludes that short nonclaim statutes
are not solely statutes of limitation and that Mullane and its progeny can be
stretched to extend to them. The merits of this debate are the subject of Part HI, infra.
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the Court made multiple references to the article and accepted
its sweeping generalization that all probate regimes are
alike,' 0 Justice O'Connor's opinion contains some new analytical twists. To the Justice's credit, she did not rely on a single
order of the probate court to satisfy state action.' The opinion stresses that the probate court is "intimately involved
throughout," and notes the court order appointing the personal
representative, the statutory requirement that notice be published immediately after appointment, court orders routinely
issued commanding the publication of notice, and the filing of
an affidavit of publication with the court.' 2 Because the nonclaim bar would not run without all of these acts, their cumulative effect was "pervasive and substantial" state action.' 3
Then, in a perplexing leap, the opinion appears to merge the
state action question and the due process issue; the very same
state action that triggers constitutional review simultaneously
guts the "self-executing" feature that "remove[s] any due process problem.""° Although the majority opinion goes on to discuss traditional elements of due process analysis, such as the
adverse impact on protected property interests and the state's
interest in the operation of a nonclaim statute, the nonclaim
bar's fate is essentially sealed when the Court divorces it from
Texaco's protective "self-executing" characterization.' 5
In arguing that the Uniform Probate Code is distinguishable
from the Oklahoma statutes and others like it, the debate
about whether there is a "self-executing" feature will be put
aside. Whether Justice O'Connor was right or wrong (although I
will argue in Part III that she was wrong), no claim is being
made here that the U.P.C. nonclaim statute, viewed in isolation, is materially different in that regard, even though under
the U.P.C. there are fewer contacts between the state and the

100. See Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 479-80,
489 (1988).
101. Id. at 487.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. As Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent, "Why there is 'state
action' in [Pope], but not in [Texaco], remains a mystery which is in no way elucidated by the Court's opinion." Id. at 493 (quoting Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516
(1982)).

1996] ESTATE CREDITORS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE UPC

431

triggering of the four-month nonclaim bar."6 Rather, the argument that the U.P.C. is distinguishable is based on the view
that, in assessing whether there is a constitutional level of
state action, it is not sufficient merely to point to some mechanical presence of an agent of the state, or a mechanical connection with some state procedure. A purposive application of the
state action requirement should take into account the setting in
which the nonclaim bar operates. Winding up the affairs of a
dead person is very much a private matter, and the extent to
which the state is intruding into the private arena is clearly a
relevant factor in the state action equation.0 7 In examining
the operation of the probate system, it is fair to assume that
the principal actor in administering an estate, the decedent's
personal representative, does not become a state actor for all
constitutional purposes merely because he or she is appointed
by a probate court.' The state action inquiry must widen its
focus and examine the relationship between the probate court
and the personal representative. Justice O'Connor suggested the
need for a broad focus when she purported to look at the "context of Oklahoma probate proceedings as a whole,""° but her
inquiry into that "context" was superficial at best and gave no
intimation that the context in other states may vary from
Oklahoma's.

106. It has been noted that the U.P.C. imposed no sanctions on a personal
representative's failure to publish the mandated notice under the pre-1989 U.P.C. . It
is arguable that this removes the statute from the taint of state action because the
personal representative, not the state, determines whether the four-month period
would begin to run. LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAw 1107-08
(1991).
107. The importance of the "public fimction" strand of analysis in the state action
doctrine is well-documented. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrrITIoNAL LAw-CASES

AND MATERIsS 987 (10th ed. 1980); TRIBE, supra note 85, at § 18-5. For a discussion
of Polk Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), see infra notes 118-19 and accompanying
text.
108. Professor Falender's position, supra notes 73, 93-99 and accompanying text,
comes close, but stops short of embracing such an expansive view. She is primarily
concerned with justifying a conclusion that the statute itself entails state action, not
with painting the personal representative as a state actor. Falender, supra note 73,
at 675.
Nor does Professor Reutlinger, who purports to puzzle that anyone could question the existence of state action, rely on the appointment of the personal representative by the court as the basis for state action. Reutlinger, supra note 4, at 449 (characterizing the action of the personal representative as "private" action).
109. Pope, 485 U.S. at 480.
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Justice O'Connor examined the context of Oklahoma probate
in the fast-forward mode. One short paragraph of the opinion
recites the steps leading up to the probate of a will and the
appointment of an executor or executrix,"0 ignoring the fact
that intestate decedents (statistically more common that testate
ones)"' may also require administration of their estates." A
slightly longer paragraph reels off the statutory highlights of
Oklahoma's provisions for notice to creditors."' Thus, in Justice O'Connor's view, probate consists of establishing a will and
paying creditors, nothing more. Where is mention of the personal representative's duty to make bond" and inventory," 5
and to file accounts of the estate's condition with the court any
time the court requires it?".6 Where is mention of the entitlement of the decedent's family to homestead and family allowances?" 7 Where is recognition of the extensive control over
the personal representative's ability to sell estate assets?". In

110. Id. at 480-81 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 22, 25, 26, 30, 101 (1981) (current
version in OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 331, 331.1, 331.2, 332, 333 (1991)).
111. Allison Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission
at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241 (1963).
112. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 121-130 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
113. Pope, 485 U.S. at 481 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 331, 332, 333 (1981)
(current version in OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 331, 331.1, 331.2, 332, 333 (1991)).
114. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 171 (1991) (bond is required in all cases, unless the
court "in its judgement make[s] an order that no bond shall be required if the circumstances indicate none is necessary.").
Not coincidentally, a survey conducted by the Committee on Administration and
Distribution of Decedents' Estates of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the ABA shows that Oklahoma is the most expensive state surveyed in which
to purchase a fiduciary bond. At $100, it is far ahead of the next most expensive
state, Kansas, at $72.50. Blueprint, supra note 53, app. at 508.
115. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 281 (1981) (all personal representatives must make
inventory and appraisement within two months of appointment "unless ordered otherwise by the court.").
116. OKLA STAT. tit. 58, §541 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
117. In addition to the homestead interest in realty, the spouse and children of a
decedent are "immediately" entitled to, inter alia, family pictures, church pews, the
family Bible, clothing, furniture, and provisions necessary for one year's supply. OKLASTAT. tit. 58, § 311 (1991 & Supp. 1994). Homestead property is not liable for prior
debts and claims unless secured by a lien. Id. §§ 311, 313. An additional category of
exempt property also takes priority over estate debts, except as needed for expenses
of the last illness, funeral expenses, and expenses of administration. Id. § 312.
118. OKEA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 381-499 (1991 & Supp. 1994). "That an Oklahoma
personal representative lacks the power freely to transfer title to estate assets without the concurrence of the court requires no citation of authority." Lilly II, supra note
54, at 35.
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fact, the title of the Oklahoma Code that covers probate procedure consists of nineteen chapters containing 406 sections of
statutory law, 9 a "context" that to Justice O'Connor is represented by just eight sections."
What cannot be gleaned from Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Pope is that Oklahoma's probate code epitomizes just the sort of
cumbersome and costly regulation that Norman Dacey and
Murray Bloom revolted against"2 and that the Uniform Probate Code tried to reform.22 It is based on the older
prototypical regime that imposed "close and detailed supervision" on the administration of estates.' There is no option to
probate a will using informal procedures like those available
under the U.P.C.,' 4 and the evidentiary requirements for formal probate are more onerous than the U.P.C.'s. At least one of
the will's witnesses ordinarily must testify personally or by
affidavit, even if probate is uncontested;' if there is opposition, all available witnesses must testify."
The administration of an Oklahoma estate takes place under
the watchful eye of the probate court, whether or not the decedent and estate beneficiaries wish to have the oversight; there
is no option for the kind of unsupervised administration that
the U.P.C. mandates.' 7 The Oklahoma procedure entails more
court hearings and more notices of hearings to all concerned,
than would be the case under the U.P.C." The precaution of

119. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58 (1991).
120. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 43, 44 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 50-76 and accompanying text.
123. Lilly rH, supra note 54, at 2.
124. See id. at 15.
125. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 30 (1991); cf. U.P.C. § 3-405 (1993) (court may order
probate on the strength of the pleadings). Oklahoma does, however, recognize selfproved wills, and they can be admitted without affidavit or testimony from the attesting witnesses. OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 55, tit. 58, § 30 (1991).
126. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 43 (1991); cf. U.P.C. § 3-406(a) (1993) (the testimony of
one available witness is sufficient).
127. See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 58 §§ 21-93 (1991).
128. See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 385(c) (notice of hearing on petition to
mortgage real estate to borrow money), 386 (publication notice of hearing on petition
to mortgage real estate), 391.1 (notice of sale of personalty at public auction), 391.2
(notice of sale of personalty at private sale), 414 (notice of order to show cause for
sale of estate realty), 421 (notice of sale of realty at public auction), 423 (notice of
private sale of realty), 502 (notice of hearing regarding decedents contract to convey
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having the personal representative file a bond is mandated
unless the court waives it," 9 while under the U.P.C. no bond
is filed by a personal representative unless the circumstances
justify an order requiring it.'
Like bonds, inventories and
appraisements of estates are presumptively required by Oklahoma law13 ' and involve excessive use of judicial power by requiring that the court appoint three appraisers. 132 The U.P.C.,
on the other hand, does not require that an inventory be filed
with the court and eliminates the involvement of the probate
court in selecting appraisers. 133 Oklahoma requires the personal representative to "render a final account, and pray a settlement of his administration" when the estate is ready to be
closed.'3 4 Further, upon final settlement, "the court must proceed to distribute the residue of the estate" to those entitled."
No formal closing procedures are required by the
U.P.C., although they are available if the personal representative wants protection from future claims for unauthorized con3
duct or breach of fiduciary duty. 1
For those who are content to view the state action test as an
exercise in identifying the presence of the state lurking some-

realty), 552 ("proper" notice of nonfinal account, subject to waiver by court), 553 (notice of final settlement), 622 (notice of beneficiary's petition for payment of legacy),
634 (notice of petition for decree of distribution) (1991 & Supp. 1994).
129. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 171 (1991). Since 1963, the courts have had the power
to excuse bond "if the circumstances indicate none is necessary." Id. However, the
power does not appear to have been exercised liberally; only an express waiver of the
bond requirement by will is effective to excuse this added expense of administration.
Lilly II, supra note 54, at 25.
130. Circumstances that justify an order requiring bond in informal proceedings
include the appointment of a special administrator, an express will provision requiring bond, and a written demand by an interested person that the personal representative give bond. U.P.C. §§ 3-603, 3-605 (1993). In formal proceedings, bond may be
required unless the will excuses it, U.P.C. § 3-603, but the U.P.C. Comments make it
clear that "[t]he purpose of these provisions is to move away from the idea that bond
always should be required of a probate fiduciary, or required unless a will excuses
it." U.P.C. § 3-603 cmt. (1993).
131. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 281 (1991).
132. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 282 (1991).
133. U.P.C. § 3-706 & cmt. (1993). The personal representative may either mail a
copy of the inventory to interested persons who request it or file an inventory with
the court; if she or he elects to file with the court, the Comments to § 3-706 clarify
that the court's role is "simply to receive and file the inventory." Id.
134. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 612 (1991).
135. OKILA. STAT. tit. 58, § 631 (1991) (emphasis added).
136. U.P.C. § 3-1003 cmt. (1993).
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where in the vicinity of the action being reviewed, or for those
who take the view that there is always state action,13 7 it may

not be sufficient to point out that there is a vast difference
between the "context" of Oklahoma probate and the Uniform
Probate Code. However, the difference is neither coincidental
nor incidental. The U.P.C. was conceived and created as the
antithesis of the heavy handed regulation of decedents' affairs
like that imposed by Oklahoma's probate laws. Surely there is
room in the jurisprudence of state action, the doctrine that has
given us Shelley v. Kraemer"' and Flagg Brothers, Inc. v.
Brooks139 to puzzle over endlessly1' for an acknowledgement
of such a difference. The state action analysis attempted here
recognizes that the deprivation of a creditor's claim is by no
means the central purpose of the proceeding of which it is a
part, but is rather one of many details that are necessarily addressed in the overall process of administering an estate. For
that reason, it is appropriate, and indeed necessary, to review
the whole proceeding and weigh the amount and nature of state
involvement in the totality of probate and administration; to
focus narrowly and exclusively on the nonclaim bar and its
mechanical trigger is a clear example of removing a thread
from the fabric into which it is woven.
Unfortunately, the state action case law does not provide
close analogies to the fact situation in Pope, but there are cases
that reflect the spirit of the approach that is being suggested
here. For example, in Polk County v. Dodson," no state ac-

137. E.g., Harold W. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The
Emerging Threshold Approach to State Action Determinations: Trying to Make Sense
of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 69 GEO. L.J. 745 (1981); William W. Van Alstyne,
Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of State Action, 1965
DUKE L.J. 219 (1965).
138. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (attempted judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenant created by private landowners is state action).
139. 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (no state action in warehouseman's self-help repossession
of tenant's goods without opportunity to be heard, as authorized by section 9-503 of
the Uniform Commercial Code).
140. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 86, § 18-6; Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal
Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer:
Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962); Rowe, supra note 137;
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296 (1982); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).

141. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
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tion was found even though the actor whose decision was being
challenged was an employee of the state, a public defender, who
had decided not to pursue an appeal that she believed was
frivolous. The court overlooked the direct connection between
the state and the public defender and focused instead on the
underlying context of the action; the public defender was more
aptly seen as an agent of her client, the criminal defendant,
than an agent of the state. Thus, she was performing "a
private function, traditionally filled by retained counsel, for
which state office and authority are not needed."" It may be
tempting to respond that, unlike Polk County's public defender,
a decedent's personal representative does not have a private
counterpart and that "state office and authority" in fact are
needed, or at least customarily bestowed, to carry out the personal representative's mission. However, as noted earlier,"
personal representatives have never heretofore been viewed as
state actors for constitutional purposes; and in any event, in
the specific context of nonclaim statutes, the personal representative is not the force that deprives a creditor of property.
Rather, a fruitful comparison with Polk County is found both in
the court's willingness to look at the overall context of the challenged act and in the importance attributed to the "private"
nature of that context. The probate and administration of
decedents' estates are even less imbued with public functions
than the criminal prosecution that gave rise to Polk County.
The absence of clearly analogous case precedent also limits
the force of Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,"' the case most
142. Id. at 319-325.
143. Id. at 319. The difficulty of harmonizing state action cases is illustrated by
the Supreme Court's later decision in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614 (1991), in which the Court, relying partly on Pope, held that state action was
present when a private litigant in a civil action used peremptory challenges to strike
potential jurors because of their race. Polk County was distinguished on the grounds
that it was a criminal case in which the relationship between the government and
the public defender was adversarial. 454 U.S. at 626. However, that distinction was
rejected as controlling in Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), in which the
Court held that criminal defendants were also state actors when making racially discriminatory peremptory strikes. Despite the Edmonson Court's reliance on the Pope
opinion that she crafted, Justice O'Connor dissented in the finding of state action in
both of the preemptory jury strike cases. Recently, she has characterized both
Edmonson and McCollum as "mistake[s]." J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct.
1419, 1432 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
144. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
145. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). Like several other state action cases discussed in this
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heavily relied on to justify the conclusion that nonclaim statutes involve state action. Justice O'Connor and Professor
Falender both cite Lugar to support their state action analyses." But Lugar, like Polk County, involved a state action
question that is structurally different from Pope's and therefore
instructive only for painting in broad strokes. Lugar is one of
several cases in which debtors challenged their creditors' use of
state proceedings to seize the debtors' property.'47 The problem, therefore, was the quintessential state action question in
due process cases-had state agents sufficiently aided the creditor in securing the property in dispute?" In holding that the
prejudgment attachment of the debtor's property in that case
was the result of state action, the majority articulated a twopart approach to the resolution of the issue.
The second
prong was "the party charged with the deprivation must be a
person who may fairly be said to be a state actor."'50 Clearly,
the relevance of this second prong is missing in Pope's state
action inquiry, where the question is not the relationship between the state and a private actor, but, as Justice O'Connor
states, "whether the State's involvement with the nonclaim
statute is substantial enough to implicate the Due Process
Clause." 5 ' A complete and penetrating answer to the question
posed by Justice O'Connor recognizes that the state's "involvement" with the nonclaim statute is a subset of its involvement
with the probate and administration process as a whole. That
involvement should not be measured by looking solely at the
point or points where the nonclaim statute happens to intersect
probate court procedures-something that the nonclaim bar
must do if it is to have its intended effect. Lugar's decision to

article, Lugar was a 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court; Chief Justice Burger filed a
dissenting opinion and Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor joined.
146. Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988);
Falender, supra note 73, at 675 n.73.
147. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
148. Id. at 933. The debtor also claimed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a major
issue in the case was the relationship between § 1983's requirement of acting "under
color of state law" and the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of state action. The
Court held that the two concepts were coextensive. Id. at 927-36.
149. Id. at 937.
150. Id.
151. Pope, 485 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added).
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transform an otherwise "private" creditor into a state actor
presented an issue sufficiently different that, if it supports the
result in Pope at all, it does so only tangentially and not directly.
Finally, the conclusion that the U.P.C.'s four-month nonclaim
bar should be viewed as lacking a constitutional level of state
action from its inception (i.e., even before the 1989 post-Pope
amendments) does not entail an argument that the U.P.C.,
where enacted into law, is totally immune from constitutional
review. The state legislature acts when it adopts any law, and
such enactment does constitute state action for purposes of
some constitutional review. For example, substantive due process principles require a rational relationship between legislative means and legitimate state interests; a nonclaim statute
that is unjustifiably short might be subject to challenge for
being arbitrary and unreasonable.'5 2 Alternatively, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause might be invoked
if the U.P.C. or any other nonclaim statute singled out a protected class of creditors for discriminatory treatment.'53 Constitutional challenges such as these single out choices made by
the state legislature for constitutional scrutiny, and it is therefore appropriate to regard the passage of the legislation as the
relevant action of the state.
In contrast, the constitutional right to personal notice that
creditors have asserted when challenging nonclaim statutes is
based on procedural due process. The Supreme Court has recognized that a state legislature's enactment of broad legislation
that does not single out any entity or individual does not lend
itself to a constitutional requirement of individual notice."
152. Falender, supra note 73, at 677 n.85. In fact, such an argument was made in
Pope, but the Court chose to decide the case on procedural due process grounds instead. Pope, 485 U.S. at 488.
153. E.g., Ex parte Estate of Evans, 384 S.E.2d 748 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1081 (1990) (equal protection challenge to U.P.C. § 3-803, which treats estates that
have liability insurance differently from estates that do not; statute upheld). The
Supreme Court has considered equal protection challenges to statutes of limitation on
several occasions. See, e.g., Paulussen v. Herion, 475 U.S. 557 (1986); Pickett v.
Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
154. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1982); see also TRIBE, supra note
85 § 10-7, at 664 ("The element of due process analysis characterized as 'procedural
due process' delineates the constitutional limits on judicial, executive, and administrative enforcement of legislative or other governmental dictates or decisions."). See gen-
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Justice O'Connor acknowledged in Pope that where the state
"has no role to play beyond enactment of the limitations period," the Due Process Clause is not implicated.'5 5 Therefore, to
impose a requirement of notice to individual creditors requires
some state action beyond legislative enactment. Justice
O'Connor cited additional state action in some rather perfunctory activities of the probate court, that supposedly represented
the "context" of Oklahoma probate.'5 6 The foregoing discussion
has illustrated that Oklahoma's probate context is not universal
in this country. Some state legislatures, particularly those that
have embraced the Uniform Probate Code, made a deliberate
choice to reject the model that Oklahoma represents and to
adopt a system that removes the state and its judicial machinery from the business of administering decedents' estates. Surely a meaningful weighing of the state action issue requires
recognition of this fundamental difference in the "context" of
probate. Consequently, it is wrong to assume that Pope applies
to all short-term nonclaim bars that are triggered by some

erally id. §§ 10.7-10.19; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 85, at ch. 13.
155. Pope, 485 U.S. at 486-87. Although the opinion in Pope goes on to distinguish
nonclaim bars from "self-executing statutes of limitations," Justice O'Connor never
identifies enactment of the statute as a factor in the state action that provokes the
Court's due process review of Oklahoma's nonclaim statute. Id. at 486-488.
Attacking the U.P.C.'s 1989 response to Pope and arguing that the U.P.C. had
not avoided state action, Professor Reutlinger seized on the Court's "concession" that
enactment is state action, and then tried to wiggle out from under what he acknowledged was an implication that "enactment alone generally is insufficient to implicate
due process." Reutlinger, supra note 86, at 448. Rather than analyzing the text of
Pope, he changed the subject to Flagg Brothers and attempted to explain why enactment of a statute (the UCC) did not implicate due process in that case, but would in
the case of nonclaim statutes. Id. He observed that "the state in enacting a probate
statute of repose has not offered private parties a choice whether to cut off claims at
the end of one year, it has mandated that all claims be cut off, regardless of any
action or inaction by any private party." Id. First of all, his observation ignores that
ordinary statutes of limitation "mandate that all claims be cut off;" therefore, it
seems to directly contradict Justice O'Connor's exemption of those claims from procedural due process review. Id. Second, the state action issue in Flagg Brothers was
not whether the statute's enactment was state action, but whether the private party
who acted pursuant to the statute's authorization was, under the circumstances, a
state actor. Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 149-51. The court never directly considered
the role that enactment had played in creating state action; the primary thrust of the
majority opinion in Flagg Brothers was that the power delegated by the state to the
private party did not involve a function reserved exclusively to the State. Id. at 15764.
156. These activities were characterized as "administrative" by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his dissent. Pope, 485 U.S. at 494 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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court-related activity, such as appointment of a personal representative or publication of notice to creditors.
IV. THE DUE PROCESS ISSUE
The state action morass that Pope plunged into5 7 could
have been avoided with a more careful review of the Mullane
principle as the Supreme Court has applied it in cases before
Pope. These cases do not lead inexorably to Pope's conclusion
that publication notice in nonclaim statutes violates due process. Careful dissection of the facts and circumstances of
Mullane's progeny reveals that Pope was an awkward and unnecessary extension of the Mullane principle in the first place.
Of course, the fact that it is an extension does not necessarily
mean that it is erroneous, but it does suggest that the issue
deserved a degree of reflection and deliberation that appears to
have been lacking.
Notice and the right to be heard are central elements of the
rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.'58 Mullane's
elaboration of what satisfies the "notice" prong has proved to be
powerful and enduring: "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections."'59
Because notice is a procedural due process issue, the issue
normally arises only when there is some sort of procedure of
which someone should be notified. A hasty analysis might lead
to the conclusion that administering the estate of a decedent
with any degree of probate court involvement is a "procedure,"

157. It is hard to avoid the speculation that the Court first decided that there was
a constitutional violation and that, in turn, forced it to address the state action issue.
158. As definitively stated by Justice Jackson in Mullane, "at a minimum [the Due
Process Clause] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication
be preceded by notice . . . " Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339

U.S. 306, 313 (1950). Professor Tribe has described the duty to give notice and an
opportunity to be heard as "the core content of procedural due process placed upon
the government." Tribe, supra note 86, at 683.
159. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
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and therefore, Mullane's standard of notice applies to all aspects of the procedure, at least when the procedure is accorded
finality. However, as will be developed below, such a conclusion
both misinterprets the relationship between nonclaim statutes
and probate proceedings and also reflects a far too rigid view of
Mullane's due process mandate.
A. "Self-executing" Statutes of Limitation
The most critical assertion in the majority opinion in Pope is
the cryptic conclusion that a nonclaim time bar "lacks the selfexecuting feature" that is "necessary to remove any due process
problem" because "the legal proceedings themselves trigger the
time bar."5 0 In one astonishing sentence, the Court manages
both to confound the issues of state action and the substantive
constitutional right of procedural due process, and to contort
earlier courts' understandings of statutes of limitations as "selfexecuting."
Courts that have characterized nonclaim statutes as statutes
of limitation, whether using the term "self-executing" or not,
have shared the realization that a creditor who is denied the
ability to pursue a claim against a decedent by operation of a
nonclaim statute is not deprived of that property interest by
any administrative or judicial action that takes place within the
confines of the probate proceeding itself. 6 ' The loss of the interest is caused instead by the legislative dictate contained in
the nonclaim statute. After the time allotted by the statute has
run, the creditor is automatically disabled from presenting a
claim. There is no adjudication that the claim has no merit; the

160. Pope, 485 U.S. at 487.
161. See Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Mo.
1985) (en banc) (describing the Missouri non-claim statute as self- executing); Gano
Farms, Inc. v. Estate of Kleweno, 582 P.2d 742, 744 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978) (notice
under the nonclaim statute "does no more than put into operation a special statute of
limitations"); see also In re Estate of Fessler, 302 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Wis. 1981).
The bar created by operation of a statute of limitations is established
independently of any adjudicatory process. It is legislative expression of
policy that prohibits litigants from raising claims-whether or not they
are meritorious-after the expiration of a given period of time ....

The

passage of time itself destroys the right and remedy of the injured party.
Id. (citations omitted).
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probate court and the probate process is no more involved in
the demise of the property right than it was involved in its
creation. The statute is self-executing in that it is not dependent on any further judicial or administrative imprimatur to
render its operation effective.162
The Pope majority, however, contorted the meaning of the
self-executing concept by applying it to the other end of the
time bar, the point when it begins to run.'6 3 Such a reorientation was necessary if the Court were to succeed in distinguishing nonclaim statutes from typical statutes of limitation. By
focusing on how the time bar was triggered (and the state's
involvement in that process), rather than on the deprivation of
the property by the running of the nonclaim bar, the Court persuaded itself that the statute was no longer "self-executing.""
There are a number of problems with the Court's treatment
of the concept of "self-executing," apart from the fact that it is
articulated with a vagueness so terse that the term's meaning
is almost impossible to fathom." It is not difficult to think of
other quite ordinary causes of action that may be triggered by,
or intimately involved with, a legal proceeding. For example, a
malicious prosecution may be remedied by a civil cause of action. 6 ' When a former plaintiff is sued for having initiated a
legal proceeding, it would seem that we have another case
where "the legal proceedings themselves trigger the time
bar."'67 If so, is the statute of limitations on the malicious
prosecution action no longer "self-executing"? According to Pope,
the self-executing feature is "necessary" to remove due process
problems.'68 If the statute of limitation in this case is not selfexecuting, what is the "due process problem" that is created?
Does the statute of limitations not run on a potential plaintiff

162. See Pope, 485 U.S. at 494 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("That term ['selfexecuting'] refers only to the absence of a judicial or other determination that itself
extinguishes the claimant's rights.").
163. Id. at 487.
164. Id. at 486-87.
165. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist called the majority's treatment of the term "out
of context and contrary to common sense." Id. at 494 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (Wrongful Prosecution of Criminal
Proceedings), § 674 (Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings) (1977).
167. Pope, 485 U.S. at 487.
168. Id.
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unless the potential defendant gives some sort of notice that
the statute is running? 6 9
Assuming that the majority used the term "self-executing" to
mean that something is capable of giving itself effect, then
taken to its logical conclusion, the Court's focus on the triggering aspect to distinguish nonclaim bars from other statutes of
limitations is unsatisfactory and unsuccessful. The majority's
explanation that the nonclaim statutes lose their self-executing
character because legal proceedings trigger them could even be
taken to mean that any external triggering event causes the
loss of self-executing capacity. Clearly, such a vision of what
deprives statutes of limitation of their self-executing feature
would deprive virtually all statutes of limitation of their "selfexecuting" powers because none of them internally generate
their own triggering event. If the majority had a more restrictive view and meant to confine its statement only to legal proceedings, the court found new meaning in the word "self' in
self-execution, but did not explain what that meaning is.
B. Mullane and Its Progeny
To understand more fully the extent to which Pope is an
aberration, it is necessary to reexamine the cases upon which
the opinion stands, ultimately tracing back to Mullane. As noted earlier, the fact that Pope is not "on all fours" with Mullane
does not prove that it was wrongly decided. But if it is palpably
different from all the cases where personal notice has been
found necessary, and strongly similar to the principal case,
Texaco, Inc. v. Short,"0 in which personal notice was not required, a serious question is raised.
Mullane, the fountainhead of the notice requirement, involved
a court action to settle the accounts of a trustee holding assets
in a common trust fund. 7 ' Under New York state law, the
action was binding and conclusive on everyone having an interest in the common fund. 72 As the Court noted, the proceeding

169.
170.
171.
172.

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
454 U.S. 516 (1982).
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1956).
Id. at 309.
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could have had the effect of cutting off the rights of the beneficiaries to sue the trustee for breach of its obligations, or otherwise diminishing their interest through the allowance of fees
and expenses. 173 Even though the trustee had available the

names and addresses of the income beneficiaries, all of the
beneficiaries of the fund were notified of the action only by
publication, as the governing state statute allowed. 74 The Supreme Court held that publication by notice "to known present
beneficiaries of known place of residence" would not suffice. 75
Significantly, however, the Court found that publication notice
was constitutional for beneficiaries "whose interests or whereabouts could not with due diligence be ascertained," and "beneficiaries whose interests are either conjectural or future or,
although they could be discovered upon investigation, do not in
due course of business come to knowledge of the common
trustee."7

The Court was swayed in its deliberations by the

practical difficulties and the expense involved in requiring personal notice, acknowledging that the imposition of overly severe
burdens on the trustee could dissipate the advantages sought to
be achieved by establishing common trust funds. 77 The Court
also thought it appropriate, in weighing the relative burdens
and benefits of the practical considerations, to defer to the
judgment of the state authorities."
A trio of cases in the 1950s and 1960s solidified Mullane and
extended its requirement of personal notice to bankruptcy and
condemnation proceedings. These cases, City of New York v.
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 79 Walker v.
City of Hutchinson,' and Schroeder v. City of New York,' 8 '
support the proposition that Mullane is not limited to a proceeding that is an "adjudication" in its narrow sense. 2 But,
as discussed below, close scrutiny reveals that they are distin173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
(1988);

Id. at 313.
Id. at 309-310.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 317-18.
Id. at 318.
344 U.S. 293 (1953).
352 U.S. 112 (1956).
371 U.S. 208 (1962).
See, e.g., Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 488
Falender, supra note 73, at 684.
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guishable from Pope in that each of them involved a judicial or
administrative process of some sort that was aimed quite specifically at the aggrieved party and was the direct cause of the
deprivation of the property interest. They fit precisely the situation, described by Professor Tribe, which invokes due process-the government's singling out of a particular person for
deprivation." Probate nonclaim bars do not.
The bankruptcy proceeding involved in New York is perhaps
the closest parallel to an estate administration. In both bankruptcy and probate proceedings, assets are marshalled by a
fiduciary; those entitled to payment are determined; and assets
are distributed. Both processes are governed by statute and
require some court involvement. New York held that a lien
creditor of the bankrupt railroad should have received actual
notice instead of publication notice of the period for filing
claims in the bankruptcy proceeding.' Technically, the case
was not decided on due process grounds because the Bankruptcy Act itself required "reasonable notice"," and the Court was
merely interpreting the statutory language. But the Court noted
Mullane's criticism of notice by publication," 6 and it seems
fair to assume that what is "reasonable notice" is governed at
least in part by due process principles."'
What is particularly instructive about New York is that, like
Mullane, the decision as to what was "reasonable notice" was
based on the totality of the circumstances, and there are striking differences between the totality of the circumstances of
bankruptcy compared to probate. First, the Court perceived a

183. TRIBE, supra note 86, at 714.
184. City of New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 344 U.S. 293
(1953).
185. Id. at 296 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(8) (1952) (current version at 11 U.S.C. §
342 (1988))).

186. Id.
187. At any rate, New York is cited with regularity in due process cases. See also,
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 797 (1983); Walker v. Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 n.4 (1956); cf. Tulsa Professional Collection Serv. Inc. v. Pope,
485 U.S. 478, 487 (1988). Interestingly, recent commentary from the bankruptcy perspective bemoans the need for more due process. See Russell A. Eisenberg and Frances Gecker, Due Process and Bankruptcy: A Contradiction in Terms?, 10 BANK. DEv.
J. 47 (1993); Robert M. Lawless, Realigning the Theory and Practice of Notice in
Bankruptcy Cases, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215 (1994).
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statutory purpose of facilitating personal notice to creditors."s
Probate nonclaim statutes, of course, do not exist in such a
statutory milieu because for decades they have expressly required no more than notice by publication. Furthermore, some
New York creditors had been given actual notice by mail of the
bankruptcy proceedings, and those creditors' claims were actually subordinate to the claim of the creditor who was not given
notice.189 Probate nonclaim statutes do not discriminate between classes of creditors; all receive the same notice by publication. Finally, the Court noted that the trustees "knew about"
the lien creditor involved. 90 The duty to give actual notice,
therefore, did not impose any initial duty to search for creditors, as it does in the probate context.
Despite some surface similarities between the proceedings of
bankruptcy and probate,"9 the mechanism by which each bars
creditors is fundamentally different. A bankruptcy petition is
initiated by a debtor for the primary purpose of rearranging
debts. The entire thrust of the proceeding is to produce a judicially sanctioned alteration of the property rights of the
bankrupt's creditors. Such a judicial determination of property
interests is entirely harmonious with the situation addressed by
Mullane and was also the focal point of the Court's concern
about notice in New York. "The statutory command for notice
embodies a basic principle of justice-that a reasonable opportunity to be heard must precede judicial denial of a party's
claimed rights."'92 In contrast, the administration of a
decedent's estate is a multi-faceted task involving collecting a
decedent's assets and reallocating them among the appropriate
successors, which may include many categories of creditors and
claimants, as well as the decedent's intended beneficiaries. The
very existence of probate machinery recognizes the legitimacy of
creditors' claims, but other interests must be balanced against
them. As will be discussed below, it is reasonable to subject

188. New York, 344 U.S. at 296.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Falender observes that "similarities abound" between probate and bankruptcy
procedures. Falender, supra note 73, at 685 n.135. But she compares very mechanical
aspects of the respective procedures, not the procedure by which they deprive creditors of their claims. See also Reutlinger, supra note 4, at 457 n.132.
192. New York, 344 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added).

1996] ESTATE CREDITORS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE UPC

447

some creditors to the risk of loss in the interest of efficient
administration of estates as a whole.'9 3
Condemnation proceedings are another instance for the application of Mullane's notice standards. In Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, the city condemned an owner's property in order to
widen streets,'
and in Schroeder v. City of New York, the
city diverted river water, which deprived downstream owners of
riparian rights. 5 In both cases, the affected owners were given notice only by publication or posting. In Walker, Mullane
was construed to apply to "proceedings which may directly and
adversely affect their legally protected interests."9 ' Schroeder
repeated the notion that the proceedings must directly affect
the protected interests.'9 7 Furthermore, the fact that the government benefitted from the taking in both cases perhaps justifies the application of a demanding standard of notice. 9 '
A case of relatively recent vintage, however, set in motion
the legal developments that culminated in the Pope case and
provided the strongest support for the majority opinion. In
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, a mortgagee's interest
in certain real property was terminated by a tax sale and the
subsequent running of a two-year period of redemption. 9 Although the owner of the property was personally notified by
mail of the pending tax sale, the only notice to the mortgagee
was by posting and publication.2" The Court noted that it had
"unwaveringly" adhered to Mullane and applied it to the tax

193. See infra Part III.
194. 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
195. 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
196. Walker, 352 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added).
197. Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 212-13.
198. Walker hints at this, stating, "It [the taking without notice] may leave government authorities free to fix one-sidedly the amount that must be paid owners for
their property taken for public use." Walker, 352 U.S. at 117.
199. 462 U.S. 791 (1983). One week after issuing its ruling in Mennonite, the Supreme Court breathed new life into attacks on nonclaim statutes by remanding a
challenge to the Nevada statute for reconsideration in light of Mennonite. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 653 P.2d 158 (Nev. 1982), vacated and remanded 463 U.S.
1202 (1983). Based on the opinion that the Nevada Supreme Court subsequently
entered, it seemed not to "reconsider," but slavishly followed what it took to be a
signal from the United States Supreme Court that the Nevada nonclaim statute was
constitutionally flawed. Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 683 P.2d 20 (Nev. 1984).
200. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 794.
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sale.20' The Court had little difficulty in finding that the
mortgagee's security interest in the real property was constitutionally protected and had been adversely affected by the
sale." 2 While not expressly limiting its opinion, the Court particularly condemned constructive notice when the interested
party (in this case, a mortgagee) is identified in an instrument
(a mortgage) that is publicly recorded.2 3
The tax sale in Mennonite bears little resemblance to the
nonclaim bar in Pope. The tax sale was a statutorily created
proceeding that operated directly on the specific property of the
affected mortgagee. The sole purpose of the sale procedure was
to create new interests and terminate old ones for the good of
the public fisc. The fact that the statute already required personal notice to at least some of the affected parties was an
indication that the Mullane principle was appropriately applied
in this context. The only real question was how far down the
hierarchy of property owners one must go to identify those
entitled to personal notice. Stating the issue thusly, it is telling
that the majority, by noting the fact that the complaining party
was identified in the public record,' had identified a class of
owners who could be located by a search of finite scope.
Overlooking the fundamental difference between a tax sale
and probate proceedings, the Pope majority seized on an imaginary similarity: the probate nonclaim bar was likened to the
two-year grace period running after the tax sale during which
the property could be redeemed.0 5 The condemnation scheme
in Schroeder has likewise been compared to nonclaim statutes
because it featured a three-year grace period after the condemnation for downstream owners to file claims for damages.2 5
The difference between the running of the time periods in those
two cases and Pope is glaring. In Mennonite and Schroeder, the
deprivations were inflicted by the earlier proceedings, the condemnation and the tax sale, respectively. In both cases, the

201. Id. at 797.
202. Id. at 798.
203. Id. at 798 n.4.
204. Id. at 798.
205. See Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484-85,
487 (1988).
206. Falender, supra note 73, at 682.
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time period existed in order for the property owner to recoup
what had been previously lost. Although the loss was not final
until the time period ran, the constitutional flaw was the absence of notice of the initial proceeding that worked the deprivation. Therefore, the grace periods in Mennonite and Schroeder
were insignificant aspects of the denial of due process; in Mennonite, the Court expressly refrained from ruling on the issue of
notice of the right to redeem. 7 The condemnation without
notice and the tax sale without notice would have violated due
process whether or not the proceedings triggered the running of
a time bar to reverse the deprivation of property. Indeed, a
time bar for reversing the loss would have been irrelevant as a
separate consideration for the finding of a due process violation.
Functionally, the time bars in those cases were no different
from a time limit for appealing a trial court decision to an
appellate court; any deprivation at the trial court level is not
final until the time for appeal has run. Therefore, the unconstitutionality of property deprivations that extend grace periods
for redemption does not provide support for the result in Pope.
The operation of a probate nonclaim bar is in fact far more
comparable to the Indiana Mineral Lapse Act upheld by the
Supreme Court in Texaco, Inc. v. Short."' The Act provided
that severed mineral interests that were not used for twenty
years would revert to the surface owner, unless a statement of
claim was filed in the county recorder's office. 0 9 Mineral owners whose interests had been severed prior to the statute's
enactment and were subject to lapse were given a two-year
grace period to file a statement of claim.210 The statute's validity was challenged on several fronts by mineral owners
whose interests ostensibly had been terminated by operation of
the statute,21 ' but the primary argument, and the only one
that is relevant here, was the claim that due process required
that the mineral owners be notified prior to the termination of
their interests.2 "
207. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 n.6 (1983).
208. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
209. Id. at 518.
210. Id. at 518-19.
211. One group of challengers was barred by the running of the two year grace
period after the statute's enactment in 1971. Another group that had acquired an
interest in 1954 was barred in 1974 by the base 20 year period. Id. at 521-22.
212. The allegation of inadequate notice included the claim that the state of Indi-
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The majority decision to uphold the Indiana Mineral Lapse
Act was expressly grounded on the distinction between a self14
executing2 1 statute that "uniformly affect[s] all citizens"
and a judicial determination that is directed at a particular
person or property interest to which Mullane applies." 5 The
Court recognized that there might be judicial proceedings based
on the Act to confirm that a specific property interest had in
fact lapsed, and that such a proceeding would not be constitutional unless it required notice to the mineral owner affected.2"' However, the initial lapse itself caused by the passage
of twenty years of non-use is an automatic general rule of law,
and not a "procedure" or adjudication that requires the protection of prior notice. Once the state has given owners a reasonable opportunity to know of the statute's existence and what it
requires, owners have the means of protecting themselves from
interests by using one of the avenues provided in
loss of their
2 17
the Act.

ana did not sufficiently notify mineral owners of the statute's 1971 enactment. The
majority easily disposed of this argument with the observation that property owners
are charged with knowledge of statutes affecting their property, and that the State
had provided ample opportunity to learn of the new obligations imposed through the
two-year grace period. Id. at 532-33; see infra note 217.
The appellants also argued that the failure to notify them of the lapse constituted a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 530. The Court summarily rejected this argument because the lapse of the
property interest occurred as a result of the owner's neglect. Id. at 530.
The third ground for challenge was that the lapse provision violated the Contract Clause. The Court rejected this challenge both on the facts and because any
burden on contractual obligations was "minimal" since the owner could safeguard his
or her interest by filing a statement of claim. Id. at 531.
Because the statute contained an exemption for those persons who owned multiple interests, the appellants challenged the statute on equal protection grounds. Id.
at 530. The Court, however, found that the exception furthered the legitimate state
interest in encouraging the actual production of mineral resources. Id. at 538-41.
213. Id. at 533, 535.
214. Id. at 537.
215. Id. at 535.
216. Id. at 536.
217. The majority and dissenters in Texaco disagreed about the State's obligation
to give notice of the statute's 1971 enactment, insofar as it affected mineral owners
who had only the two-year grace period within which to file suit. Id. at 531-533, 549.
The majority simply relied on the proposition that property owners are charged with
knowledge of statutes affecting their property, and that the State provided ample
opportunity to learn of the new obligations with the two-year grace period. Id. at 532.
The dissent would have required notice to owners whose preexisting mineral interests
were cut off by the statute's enactment, subject to the grace period; interestingly, the
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Although Pope labored valiantly to distinguish Texaco, the
probate nonclaim bar is far more analogous to the Lapse Act in
Texaco than it is to Mullane and its progeny. Texaco recognized
that there is a difference between termination of an interest by
a time bar statute and court proceedings that relate to that
termination.2 18 Although some facet of probate proceedings
may trigger the running of a nonclaim bar at the outset, the
proceedings are not instrumental in the ultimate termination of
the claim by the operation of the nonclaim statute. Once set in
motion, the nonclaim bar is independent of the probate proceedings and every bit as self-executing as the Lapse Act and statutes of limitations. It can even be argued that nonclaim statutes more closely resemble concededly valid traditional statutes
of limitations than does the Mineral Lapse Act. The nonclaim
bar is designed to preclude the assertion and adjudication of
claims, regardless of the facts, while the Mineral Lapse Act as
a practical matter is likely to involve frequent individualized
adjudications of specific facts in order to determine that a lapse
has occurred.
In sum, prior to Pope, all of the cases that have imposed a
duty to give personal notice descend in a straight line from
Mullane and share with it the central fact that a legal proceeding was initiated for the specific purpose of affecting certain
persons' property interests. The culmination of the legal proceeding itself was the mechanism for altering property interests. No matter how one attempts to explain or redefine probate nonclaim statutes, the statutes are not legal procedures,
and they, themselves, do not single out individual creditors for
deprivation of property. Nor does the related probate process
exist for the purpose of depriving creditors of their lawful
claims.

dissent conceded that the notice to such owners could be accomplished by publication.
Id. at 543 n.2. The strong dissenting opinion by four Justices in Texaco in no way
strengthens Pope, even though three of Texaco's dissenters joined the Pope majority.
The dissent in Texaco is expressly limited to the retroactive application of the Lapse
Act to preexisting mineral interests. Id. at 540. Voluntary creditors who are cut off
by nonclaim bars are not similarly situated; they entered into a transaction with the
decedent with knowledge, or imputed knowledge, of the existing nonclaim bar.
218. See id. at 533.
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Like statutes of limitation, nonclaim statutes simply set a

time period beyond which creditors' claims are unenforceable.
To maintain that they are not "self-executing" because they are
triggered by some facet of a legal process reduces the grand
constitutional principle of due process to a game of fixing labels
on challenged actions. The label "self-executing" should not
become a constitutional talisman. Unfortunately, its use by the
Court disguises the fact that Pope is a great and unexplained
leap in the evolution of the Due Process Clause. Apart from its
questionable use of technical labels to force the statute into a
certain mold, the Court also committed the more egregious
error of total insensitivity to the circumstances surrounding the
nonclaim bar, as will be discussed below.
C. Mullane's Balancing Test
The constitutional imperative of procedural due process is
grounded in the concept of fairness. The Supreme Court has
recognized that fairness must be determined by the context in
which the due process issue arises. "The very nature of due
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally
applicable to every imaginable situation."219 Thus the Supreme
Court has consistently approached the question of due process
as a matter of balancing the competing interests at stake."'
219. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961) (construing FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 275-76
(1949)); see also Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962) (noting that
"practical considerations" exist "which make it impossible to draw a standard set of
specifications as to what is constitutionally adequate notice, to be mechanically applied in every situation.").
220. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) ("The ultimate balance
involves a determination as to when, under our constitutional system, judicial-type
procedures must be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness."); TRIBE,
supra note 86, §§ 10-13, at 715-16.
Courts often speak of balancing the interest of the state and that of the party
seeking notice. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 313-14 (1950). When performing the balancing test for a non-claim statute, however, it is appropriate to weigh the interests of the decedent's estate, as well as those
of the state itself. The state's interest is paramount in cases where the state is a
party to the proceedings, such as condemnations or tax sales. See, e.g., Mennonite Bd.
of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983) (tax sale); Schroeder v. City of New York,
371 U.S. 208 (1962) (condemnation). A state's enactment of a nonclaim statute, however, embodies the interests of the estate and family survivors as well as those of the
state itself.
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To properly engage in the balancing exercise, an understanding of the circumstances is necessary, just as it is necessary to
properly apply the concept of state action. And once again, at
this critical first point in the balancing process, the Court's
opinion in Pope shows absolutely no sensitivity to or understanding of the probate process.
Probate differs from most other civil court proceedings because its initiation is less voluntary. In the typical court process, the state makes available a procedure that, if pursued
successfully, will culminate in a result desired by the initiating
party. A child may be adopted; a divorce may be obtained;
damages may be granted; and so on. In some cases (adoption,
for example), the court proceeding is a means, and perhaps the
only means, of facilitating a choice made by the initiating party. In other cases, such as a personal injury action, the law suit
is a voluntarily chosen response to redress an injury suffered
involuntarily.
The initiation of probate and administration, in contrast, is a
necessary aftermath to death-an event that itself is hardly a
matter of choice. Neither the event that gives rise to the occasion to utilize the courts nor the initiation of the proceeding
itself is truly choice driven. Occasionally survivors may be able
to totally ignore the probate process because of the size and
composition of the decedent's estate, and some decedents may
opt to use significant amounts of nonprobate devices. When
property is left behind, however, survivors usually must utilize
the process because there is no choice but to wind up the
decedent's affairs through the court process made available by
the state.
The involuntary nature of the triggering event, death, is only
part of the picture. Just as important is the fact that death inherently inflicts a measure of pain and deprivation on the survivors, even those survivors who gain financially through the
wealth transfer process upon death. Although there is no
dearth of tales of ancestors murdered by greedy heirs or of
testators slain by scheming will beneficiaries, more often the
survivors' dominant emotions are grief and mourning. There is
every reason, therefore, for the rules that govern this procedure
to be crafted with compassion and sympathy for the surviving
loved ones who must attend to the mundane business and legal
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affairs involved in winding up the decedent's estate, while their
hearts and minds are grappling with the spiritual and emotional process of grieving.
Certainly, a creditor brings some weight to the balancing
scale, and even those most profoundly saddened must deal with
the reality that life for the survivors goes on. Nevertheless,
what seems to be overlooked in the haste to be fair to creditors
is that a requirement to send notice to "reasonably ascertainable" creditors affects every probate estate, whether or not
there are actually any creditors. The onus of conducting a
search to determine whether any creditors are "reasonably
ascertainable" is imposed across the board on every family of
every decedent, whether the estate is large or small, simple or
complicated. The requirement, therefore, will result in the
waste of untold dollars and human energy, spent in many cases
merely to document that the creditors indeed were the phantoms that the family believed to be nonexistent in the first
place."' In the context of probate, then, the notice requirement imposes a needless search burden on many persons who
are involuntary users of the court process and who are likely to
be overwhelmed already with new burdens.
Furthermore, the search burden that emanates from Pope is
clearly more onerous than the burden imposed by Pope's predecessors. In those cases, as discussed above, the party upon
whom the duty to give notice was imposed was in a position to
have first-hand knowledge of the identity of the party or parties
to whom notice had to be given. The Mullane decision required
the defendant trustee to give personal notice by mail to known
beneficiaries of common trust funds whose names and post
office addresses were "at hand."222 In New York, the bankrupt-

221. Professor Waterbury has noted that, if statutes do not elaborate on the Supreme Court's pronouncement, "[I]t is likely that . . . personal representatives will
tend to respond by conducting rather extensive searches, impairing the prompt and
economical administration of estates while infrequently revealing additional creditors."
Waterbury, supra note 4, at 782.
See Fruehwald, supra note 4, at 1058 (The personal representative would be
well advised to keep good records of the 'diligent' search" because "[a] diligent
search . . . raises the presumption that the creditor was not 'reasonably
ascertainable" under Indiana law.).
222. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318. Those beneficiaries of the Mullane trust "whose
interests [were] either conjectural or future" were not entitled to such notic6 because
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cy statute required the filing of a list of all known creditors,
apparently as a basis for identifying the parties to whom reasonable notice had to be given.2" In Walker (condemnation),
Schroeder (condemnation), and Mennonite (tax sale), the party
upon whom the notice burden rested knew the specific real
property against which action was being taken, and in each
case, the Court observed that the identity of the owner of the
affected interest was also easily accessible through the public
records.2" Thus, in each case, the scope of the burden to
search for parties to be given personal notice was considerably
circumscribed.
The personal representative of a decedent is in a vastly different posture. First of all, there is the handicap of not having
personal knowledge of all of the decedent's affairs, whether
business or personal, which may have led to obligations or
debts still outstanding at death.2" Secondly, there is no limit
on the types or sources of claims that may be asserted.226
Both of these factors make the personal representative's task
more complicated and treacherous as unanswered questions
about duty and liability abound.

the practical costs of conducting a search for them would destroy the advantages of
the trust. Id.
223. City of New York v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford R.R., 344 U.S. 293,
296 (1952). Although this requirement was not complied with in the case, both the
bankrupt railroad and its bankruptcy trustee knew of the claim of the City of New
York but failed to send it personal notice by mail of the period for filing claims. Id.
224. Walker v. Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956); Schroeder v. City of New
York, 371 U.S. 208, 210 (1962); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791,
798 n.4 (1983). In Mennonite, the public records did not provide a street or post office
box address for the mortgagee; it only identified the county in which the corporation
was incorporated. 462 U.S. at 798 n.4. However, the Court assumed "that the
mortgagee's address could have been ascertained by reasonably diligent effort." Id. It
also conceded that a letter addressed only to the corporation by county and state was
likely to be properly delivered by the post office and thus provide actual notice. Id.
Taking a position that is strikingly at odds with her Pope opinion, Justice O'Connor
expressed concern about the uncertainty of the search burden being imposed, prophetically characterizing it as "ominous." Id. at 805.
225. Falender concedes that the range of knowledge of personal representative is
wide, from no knowledge to intimate knowledge. Falender, supra note 73, at 695.
226. Such types may include 'joint obligors, partners, landlords, bailees, credit card
issuers, 'charge account creditors, professional advisors, ex-spouses with alimony or
child support claims, tort claimants, and any other known or knowable person who
might have a claim against the decedents estate." Id. at 694 (footnote omitted).
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For those of us who lead organizationally-challenged lives,
having to pore through our piles of unfiled or wrongly filed
receipts, statements, invoices, and memos to determine the
present state of our affairs is a chilling thought. The task
would be near impossible to an outsider. Even if we manage to
impose some order and some methodical record-keeping on the
conduct of our day-to-day lives, an outsider charged with locating our "reasonably ascertainable" creditors must have some
trepidations. Observers who have considered the scope of the
personal representative's duty to search for "reasonably ascertainable" creditors have not offered much reassurance to the
fiduciary. Attempting to lay the groundwork for the rule of
notice later adopted in Pope, Professor Falender broadly pronounced that the duty should include searching the decedent's
home, office and safe deposit box, and books and records found
there.227 Furthermore, inquiry should be made of "decedent's
relatives, acquaintances, business associates, and professional
advisers whom the representative believes to be fertile sources
of information."2" It has even been suggested that it is not
enough just to make inquiry; if the reply to an inquiry is incomplete or erroneous, the personal representative should be
charged with the actual knowledge of heirs, devisees, and acquaintances.2 29 The Pope opinion itself, however, suggests a
less rigorous interpretation of who is a "reasonably ascertainable" creditor by refusing to assume that Mrs. Pope's awareness
of her husband's long stay at the Medical Center translated
into knowledge of the Collection Services's claim."'
In contrast to Mullane, which excluded "conjectural" or "future" claimants, and those who did not "in the due course of
business come to knowledge" of the trustee,2 3 1 Pope announced
no limit on the type of claimant who is entitled to notice of the
nonclaim bar.232 If a nonclaim statute purports to cut off contingent claims, Pope logically applies to such contingent claims,
as well as matured ones.233 In making the search of the
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 695.
Id.
Id.
Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 491 (1988)
339 U.S. at 317.
Pope, 485 U.S. at 491.
See Falender, supra note 73, at 670, 694.
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decedent's environs, therefore, the personal representative must
be alert to findings that perhaps only indirectly suggest claims
of an unusual nature. The most intimate details-even
secrets-of a decedent's life could in hindsight be found sufficient to have raised a "reasonable" inference of a potential
claim. Do the ministrations of a neighbor or acquaintance signal a possible claim for services rendered?"M Must every patient or client of a professional be considered a potential malpractice claimant?1 5 If the decedent died of AIDS, should the
representative make "reasonable" efforts to ascertain and notify
sexual partners who may have a tort claim due to the
decedent's failure to disclose?
It is true that carefully drafted legislation defining the scope
of the personal representative's duty may alleviate the burden
somewhat,"5 but the fact remains that the Supreme Court apparently failed to take into account the different milieu in
which the constitutional mandate of notice would be operative.
Under a balancing approach to due process requirements, a
more penetrating analysis of the nature of the burden being
imposed would have been attempted and would have revealed
significant distinctions between Pope's facts and the constitutional precedents that were found applicable.
The closest similarity can be found in the bankruptcy proceedings of New York in that the range of claims that can be
filed and the type of creditor that must be notified is not limited. 7 However, the trustee in bankruptcy has a considerable
advantage over a decedent's personal representative. The trustee ordinarily is not hindered by the impossibility of acquiring
personal knowledge; the petitioning bankrupt is alive and available as a source of information, and is required to file a schedule of creditors."5

234. See Fruehwald, supra note 4, at 1057.
235. Spencer, supra note 4, at 57.
236. See Fruehwald, supra note 4, at 1056-57 (describing how Indiana's statutory
requirements respond to such concerns).
237. Under the Bankruptcy Code, "claim" includes a "right to payment, whether or
not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured." 11
U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
238. 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1988); see 3 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTGY § 521.03[1], at 521-12
(Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1995). Collier notes that the preparation of the

458

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:411

Just as the foregoing discussion suggests that the Supreme
Court undervalued the interests of the estate and of the state
in promoting efficiency in the administration of decedent's estates, at the other end of the scales, the Court seems to have
attributed too much weight to the creditors' interests. In the
first place, the risk that payment of a debt will be jeopardized
by the debtor's death is foreseeable and assumed by the creditor. Second, creditors as a class have given no indication that
the probate process is a valuable means of collecting unpaid
obligations.
In deciding whether a constitutional duty exists, the Supreme
Court has considered which party can better shoulder the burden.239 The notice cases have not been an exception, and the
Court has at times remarked on the ability of parties to protect
themselves.'
Ironically, one of the most forceful recent statements comes from Justice O'Connor herself in her dissent in
Mennonite, the case that her Pope opinion relies on so heavily.
Her Mennonite dissent defended notice by publication to mortgagees because loss of their interest through a tax sale was not
completely unexpected.2 4' Since "the assessment of taxes occurs with regularity and predictability," a tax sale cannot be
characterized as unexpected.2 42 She also thought it relevant
that most of the holders of mortgages are private institutional
lenders or federally supported agencies who are well aware of
the consequences of the borrower's nonpayment of taxes.2" In
other words, mortgage holders are powerful and sophisticated in

schedule is "one of the most important duties of the debtor's attorney. . . . This is
particularly true with regard to setting forth the names and the addresses of the
creditors." Id. § 521.03[3], at 521-14.
239. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Considering the constitutionality of an intestacy statute that denied inheritance between children born out of
wedlock and their fathers, the Court addressed where the "burden of inertia in writing a will" falls. "At least when the disadvantaged group has been a frequent target
of discrimination, as illegitimates have, we doubt that a State constitutionally may
place the burden on that group by invoking the theory of 'presumed intent." Id. at
775 n.16.
240. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 535 n.28 (1982).
241. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 808 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 808.
243. Id.
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the ways of the world. They also have the means to protect
themselves, including checking the public tax records.'"
These observations can be superimposed on the vast majority
of estate creditors with very little alteration. A debtor's death is
not a completely unexpected event; it may not happen at regular and predictable intervals, but neither does a tax sale. Nonpayment of taxes, not their regular and predictable assessment,
precipitates a tax sale, and nonpayment is neither certain to
occur nor regular in timing. In that sense, loss by death is even
more to be expected than loss by a tax sale; death is certain to
occur and only its timing is in question. Many estate creditors
are large corporations that regularly extend consumer debt to a
high volume of customers. As Justice O'Connor observed in
Mennonite, such creditors know or should know of the consequences of a customer's death, namely, the possibility of nonpayment and the existence of a nonclaim bar triggered by proActual knowledge of the
bate proceedings after death.'
debtor's death is likely to come their way within a reasonably
short time of death,2" and for those cases where that is not
so, a regular check of the legal notices would provide such
knowledge. Unlike a party who is completely unaware of an
action which threatens loss, creditors should reasonably anticipate death and are in a position to protect themselves from loss
by their vigilance.
Furthermore, the behavior of creditors as a class and the
opinions they have expressed, to the extent that evidence exists,
strongly suggest that they will not greatly benefit from the
burden being imposed on estates to give actual notice. As just
noted, it is probable in most cases of outstanding debt (as opposed to contingent claims) that the creditor is likely to acquire
actual knowledge, or to be put on some sort of inquiry notice,
within a fairly short time of the decedent's death, without any

244. Id. at 809.
245. Id. at 808.
246. In Pope, for example, the creditor was the assignee of the hospital where the
debtor died. Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 482
(1988). See also Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 86, 87
(Mo. 1985) (en banc), where the complaining creditor provided medical services to the
decedent prior to death and thus probably had knowledge of the likelihood that death
was imminent, if not of its exact timing.
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separate formal notice arriving in the mail." 7 Nor does it appear that creditors have ever perceived themselves as seriously
disadvantaged by publication notice of a nonclaim bar. During
the drafting of the original Uniform Probate Code in the 1960s,
the voices of creditors and their organizations were largely
silent.'
Professor Langbein has attributed the enormous
growth in nonprobate transfers of wealth at death in large part
to the declining need of creditors for the protection offered by
the probate system.249 More recently, the decision in Pope does

247. Of course, actual knowledge of death is not in itself knowledge of the nonclaim bar, and for that reason, it has been suggested that such actual knowledge is
not sufficient notice under Pope. Fruehwald, supra note 4, at 1053. However, death of
the debtor is an absolutely necessary prerequisite to triggering the time bar (even if
it is not the triggering event itself), and creditors should be presumed to know the
law governing the transactions they enter into, including the nonclaim bar with its
provision for notice by publication. Therefore it is reasonable to expect creditors who
learn of a debtor's death to take action to protect their claims from becoming time
barred.
Although the Supreme Court held in City of New York v. New York, New Haven, and Hartford R.R., 344 U.S. 293, 297 (1953) that the creditor's actual knowledge
of the railroad's reorganization did not mitigate the duty to give the creditor mailed
notice, the knowledge imputed to the creditor because of its presumed familiarity
with the law was starkly different from what a decedent's creditors might have been
presumed to know in Pope. The Court assumed that the creditor knew of the Bankruptcy Statute's requirement of reasonable notice and could reasonably assume that it
would receive such notice before its claims would be barred. Id. at 297. "When the
judge ordered notice by mail to be given [to] the appearing creditors, New York City
acted reasonably in waiting to receive the same treatment." Id.
248. Richard W. Effland, Rights of Creditors in Nonprobate Assets, 48 MO. L. REV.
431 (1983). An exception to the silence was the American Association of Trial Lawyers, who spoke out ostensibly on behalf of tort creditors, but whose members' means
of livelihood would also be curtailed by broad nonclaim statutes. Concerns of the trial
lawyers are reflected in U.P.C. § 3-803(c) (1982), which excepts from the nonclaim
bar, to the extent of insurance protection, "any proceeding to establish liability of the
decedent . . . for which he is protected by liability insurance."
249. Langbein, supra note 37, at 1120-25. In the vast majority of cases, creditors
rely on voluntary payment of outstanding balances by the decedent's survivors. Medical insurance, life insurance, credit life insurance, and security interests also help to
create a "formidable battery" of payment and collection options. Langbein concludes,
"If modern creditors had needed to use probate very much, they would have applied
their considerable political muscle to suppress the nonprobate system." Id. at 1125;
see also WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 593 (1988)
("[T]he protection administration affords to creditors is illusory because it can be
avoided by keeping property out of probate."); Effland, supra note 248, at 431. But
see Helen B. Jenkins, Rights of Unsecured Estate Creditors Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act in Property Transferred Prior to Death, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 275
(1992).
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not seem to have inspired creditors' lawyers to push for legislation embodying their clients' newly recognized rights.25
A final point harks back to the unique interplay between the
state action issue and the merits of the due process issue in
Pope. Most assessments of Pope agree that a time bar running
for a reasonable length of time from the date of death is valid
because it escapes constitutional scrutiny; invalidity results only
when there is a significant linkage between the time bar's trigger and probate court proceedings. What the majority failed to
realize in Pope is that the legislative decision to tie the nonclaim bar's trigger to some facet of the probate proceedings does
not reflect an intimate wedding of the state "procedure" and the
operation of the nonclaim bar. The decision is entirely rational
and may well inure to the benefit of creditors.
Having determined that a short nonclaim bar was desirable,
the legislature surely realized that the time interval between a
debtor's death and the initiation of probate proceedings will
vary from case to case. A short time bar tied to the date of
death might run before the official mechanism for the payment
of debts was initiated. Either designation of appointment of the
personal representative or published notice to creditors suggests
a logical choice. Both are flexible and automatically adjust to
provide an appropriate amount of time in each individual case.
The Supreme Court's unfortunate oversight of the dynamics and
realities of estate administration have thus produced an irrational disparity in the treatment of "long" death-triggered time
bars and "short" nonclaim bars that may stand as yet another
monument to the vagaries of the state action issue.
Although the decision in Pope appears to have been accepted
without great clamor, the absence of criticism is surely accounted for by the fact that probate law is not exactly a glamour
industry within legal circles. However, this article has attempted to reveal that Pope does not have a solid and respectable
constitutional pedigree, nor is it supported by a clear and accurate assessment of the milieu that it affects. That being the
case, it would be wise for courts in the future to limit its application, as some have already done."' One cannot but wonder
250. Spencer, supra note 4, at 59 n.12.
251. See, e.g., Wishbone, Inc. v. Eppinger, 829 P.2d 434, 437 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991),
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whether, in a decade or so, Pope will be seen to have suffered
the same fate as Labine v. Vincent,252 in which the Supreme
Court upheld Louisiana inheritance laws that discriminated
against children born out-of-wedlock.253 Though never overruled, Labine has been distinguished out of meaningful existence."M Preliminary indications from the Supreme Court
point precisely in that direction, as the Court on several occasions has declined opportunities to extend Pope.255
V.

CONCLUSION

Inevitably, death inflicts loss. This fact is not subtle to grasp,
and most people do understand it and also understand the
desirability of anticipating the event by planning. Surely, creditors transacting business with individuals are no exception.
When the event happens, the losses vary, just as we as individuals vary in our personalities, values, and accomplishments. So
also each survivor experiences the loss differently, depending
upon his or her own makeup and relationship with the decedent. It is not possible for the state to prevent the survivors'
personal sense of loss, or to restore a breadwinner's earnings or

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 869 (1992) (declining to apply Pope's state action analysis to
Colorado's "self-executing" nonclaim statute requiring claim to be filed within four
months after performance by personal representative was due).
252. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
253. Id. at 539-40. After Labine, the Louisiana Supreme Court declared that the
Louisiana Civil Code article that was upheld in Labine violated Louisiana's own Constitution. Succession of Brown, 388 So.2d 1151, 1154 (La. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
998 (1981).
254. In Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), while striking down Illinois' treatment of children in its inheritance scheme, the Court attempted to explain why
Louisiana's statutory scheme of family regulation justified the discrimination in
Labine, 430 U.S. at 768 n.13, but at the same time the Court admitted that Labine
was "difficult to place in the pattern of this Court's equal protection decisions and
subsequent cases have limited its force as precedent." 430 U.S. at 767 n.12.
255. Wishbone, Inc. v. Eppinger, 829 P.2d 434 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 869 (1992); In re Estate of Gleason (Raince v. Gleason), 631 So. 2d 321
(Fla. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 726 (1995); In re Estate of Danesc, 641
So. 2d 423 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994), reh'g denied, 651 So.2d 1193 (Fla.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 2556 (1995); In re Estate of Wilson (Phipps v. Wilson), 610 N.E.2d 851 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 879 (1994); Warfel v. Brady, 619 A.2d 171
(Md. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3348 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1993) (No. 94-483); In re
Estate of Gumbreck (Blaschve v. Causey), 63 OKLA. B.J. 49 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1035 (1992).
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a nurturer's daily ministrations. However, it is reasonable, and
it should not be unconstitutional, for the state to alleviate the
burden by fostering simplicity and efficiency in the administration of decedents estates, as the Uniform Probate Code has
sought to do by minimizing court involvement in what is essentially a private matter. The Constitution's Due Process Clause
should not be used as a blunt instrument to impose on a surviving family the burden of soliciting creditors to come forward
and present their claims when those same creditors chose not
to exercise precautions to protect their interests from such a
loss.

